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ABSTRACT
This thesis describes an approach to designing hazard avoidance alerting systems based
on a Markov decision process (MDP) model of the alerting process, and shows its
benefits over standard design methods. One benefit of the MDP method is that it
accounts for future decision opportunities when choosing whether or not to alert, or in
determining resolution guidance. Another benefit is that it provides a means of modeling
uncertain state information, such as unmeasurable mode variables, so that decisions are
more informed.
A mode variable is an index for distinct types of behavior that a system exhibits at
different times. For example, in many situations normal system behavior tends to be
safe, but rare deviations from the normal increase the likelihood of a harmful incident.
Accurate modeling of mode information is needed to minimize alerting system errors
such as unnecessary or late alerts.
The benefits of the method are illustrated with two alerting scenarios where a pair of
aircraft must avoid collisions when passing one another. The first scenario has a fully
observable state and the second includes an uncertain mode describing whether an
intruder aircraft levels off safely above the evader or is in a hazardous blunder mode.
In MDP theory, outcome preferences are described in terms of utilities of different state
trajectories. In keeping with this, alerting system requirements are stated in the form of a
reward function. This is then used with probabilistic dynamic and sensor models to
compute an alerting logic (policy) that maximizes expected utility. Performance
comparisons are made between the MDP-based logics and alternate logics generated with
current methods. It is found that in terms of traditional performance measures (incident
rate and unnecessary alert rate), the MIDP-based logic can meet or exceed that of alternate
logics.
Thesis Supervisor: James K. Kuchar
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Nomenclature
Functions
bs Belief state
E Expected value
o Sensor function
P Probability
R Reward function
T State transition function
U State expected utility
UIC Trajectory utility
Scalar Parameters and Variables
a Alerting system action
ao Deferral (nominal) action
ap Previous action
AS Alert status index
ASp Previous alert status
BS Belief state index
CS Combination state index
D Nominal vertical level-off separation
C Number of policy or value iterations
y Reward discounting factor
k Discrete time index
m Mode variable, also number of utility recursions
mi Index of the ith mode
n Number of states in situation state space, S
q Number of actions in alert action space, A
t Time
to Current time
At Time increment
UCR Correct rejection utility
USA Successful alert utility
UUA Unnecessary alert utility
vclimb Constant evasion climb rate
vclosing Constant horizontal closing rate
Vdescent Constant nominal intruder descent rate
vw Climb rate disturbance input
x Horizontal separation
Xf Final horizontal separation
xp Previous horizontal separation
Ax Horizontal position increment
y Vertical separation
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yf Final vertical separation
yp Previous vertical separation
Sets
A Alert space
H Hazard space
o Observation space
S Situation space
Trajectories
T A trajectory in S
Ta A trajectory of alerting actions
Vectors
a Vector alert action signal
ak k th alert action
dh Disturbance input to humans
dp Disturbance input to plant
ns Sensor noise input
o Alerting system observations of situation
S Situation state
U Human input to plant
Xa Alerting system state
Xh Human state
xp Plant state
y Human observations of plant
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1. Introduction
1.1 Hazard Avoidance Alerting
Automatic alerting systems are often included in situations where humans interact
with machines, such as in vehicles and industrial processes, and unnoticed failures can
have serious consequences. An alerting system monitors a situation and, when necessary,
generates alerts and other signals to prevent an undesirable incident. It can be as simple
as an alarm triggered by an out-of-range sensor reading, but in recent years more
complex alerting systems have appeared that gather comprehensive information, use
sophisticated decision algorithms, and provide guidance to aid the human operator after
the initial alert. Such systems are possible thanks to increasing availability of the needed
sensor, communications and computer technology. Examples of successful alerting
systems are the mid-air collision (Harman, 1989; O'Hara, 1998; Nordwall, 2002) and
terrain (Phillips, 2001; Feith, 2002) avoidance systems installed in many aircraft cockpits.
New alerting systems are frequently created or proposed, especially in aviation where
they help counteract the negative safety effects of increasing use of airports and airspace,
and reduced separation requirements (Scott, 2001; Jones, 2002; Cassell et al, 2001;
Carpenter & Kuchar, 1997; Samanant et al, 2000; Zhao & Rock, 2002).
An alerting system takes a stream of state measurements as input, and by some
mathematical criteria or logic decides whether or not to alert. If an alert has already
happened, the logic decides what additional cues to give the operator. Designing the
logic traditionally means choosing a candidate logic, evaluating its performance with
simulated scenarios, making changes to fix problems, and repeating the process. The
final logic may be significantly different or more complicated than the original due to
cumulative improvements.
17
The initial candidate logic can be chosen in different ways. One common
approach is to think of the threshold as a boundary between normal and abnormal system
behavior, so the alert indicates a loss of conformance. An example is the "rumble strips"
along the edges of many highways that alert a driver whose vehicle may be drifting off of
the road. A more complex approach to alerting is to predict the trajectory of state
variables and issue an alert if the future proximity of the hazard calls for it. Typically
these predictive alerting logics use a rough trajectory model (e.g. not taking prediction
uncertainties into account) in conjunction with a state space hazard model and limits on
prediction time to avoid alerting too early. Though reasoning explicitly about the
potential hazard, such a logic still requires performance analysis and tuning, since the
model only roughly describes the conditions justifying an alert (Yang & Kuchar, 2002).
Appendix B has a more complete discussion of these different philosophies of alerting.
Recent research has produced design methods where alerting decisions are made
based on metrics of predicted decision performance at that time, rather than on rough
criteria (Yang & Kuchar, 2002; Kuchar & Yang, 2000). The aim is to reduce the need for
trial and error adjustment of a logic by more clearly stating the alerting requirements, and
making more informed alerting decisions in the knowledge of these. In systems with
random dynamics, where only uncertain state predictions are possible, the required
decision metrics tend to be probabilistic quantities (e.g. incident frequencies or
probabilities of future incidents).
Motivated by two new design considerations to be introduced next, this thesis
continues in the vein of probabilistic prediction-based alerting, with the goals of
improving alerting system performance and providing insight into alerting problems.
1.2 Modes and Future Decisions
In many cases a specific event can be identified (such as equipment failure or an
operator error) as triggering a change in the dynamics of an observed human-controlled
system, so that different models describe its behavior better at different times. In
18
particular, the event may mark a change from safe to unsafe system behavior. An
example is a vehicle on a highway becoming dangerous after its driver falls asleep.
Distinct dynamic behaviors a system can exhibit are termed modes. Figure 1.1
illustrates the mode idea for an aircraft in a situation where it could either crash into a
mountain top (1) or climb safely over it (2), depending on the vertical path mode being
2
Figure 1.1: Uncertain Situation Modes
used by the aircraft's autoflight system. Uncertainty about which mode the aircraft is in
makes it unclear whether an alert is needed: alerting with mode 2 might cause an
irritating, unnecessary alert if the human is already aware of the mountain, but failing to
alert with mode 1 could allow a crash. Due to the general difficulty of avoiding all such
errors in the presence of uncertainty (Kuchar, 1996), the alerting system may be forced to
weigh the costs of different errors and make a probability trade-off between the two. Or
the alerting system might take steps to reduce the mode uncertainty to allow more exact
predictions and better decisions. One objective of this thesis is to discuss the modeling of
mode uncertainty, and show the benefits of a Bayesian probabilistic approach to mode
uncertainty modeling.
A related issue is how knowledge about the system dynamics is used to achieve
the goals of alerting. This includes taking into account for the current alerting decision
the fact that there will be new infon-nation available in the future, and future choices to
make. Figure 1.2 illustrates this issue, again using the aircraft and terrain example.
Initially the alerting system is uncertain about the operating mode of the aircraft and it
must decide whether or not to alert, triggering a climb avoidance maneuver, or defer the
alert for possible use later. If it issues an alert immediately the alert would be safe but
19
maybe unnecessary. Because future observations will reduce uncertainty about the mode,
deferring the alert would clarify the need for an alert once the path branching point b
Immediate alert Deferred alert
b
Figure 1.2: Anticipating New Information and Decision Opportunities
is passed. The path taken would make the actual mode apparent. If the collision path
were taken, then alerting would not risk an unnecessary alert. If deferring would also
leave time for a safe avoidance maneuver, then it makes sense to defer the alert.
Typically, however, there is no clear branching point like point b in actual situations,
making the decision to defer alerting more challenging. There is an interesting balance
between acting early on uncertain information, ensuring safety but maybe unnecessarily,
versus delaying action to better know the mode being used and loosing flexibility for
avoiding a threat. Investigating the benefits of such reasoning in an alerting system, but
in a more general probabilistic framework, is the second thesis objective.
1.3 Thesis Overview
This thesis presents a new methodology for the design of hazard avoidance
alerting, motivated by certain needs not yet addressed by existing design and analysis
methods. One need is to incorporate reasoning about future decision opportunities into
an alerting and guidance logic. Another is to include reasoning about uncertain,
unobservable dynamic modes in the logic. In both cases there is also a need to determine
any benefits of such information. Finally, there must be an approach to using the desired
information in a way that is efficient enough that alerting decisions can be made in real
time.
Chapter 2 gives an overview of probabilistic prediction-based alerting and
provides more detailed motivation for the two new considerations. This includes
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formally defining model components and showing how different metrics of performance
are used for defining and analyzing alerting thresholds.
Chapter 3 contains a review of related research, pointing out similarities to other
work and significant differences that make this work necessary.
Chapter 4 covers the basics of Markov decision process (MDP) theory in the
context of alerting, using model components defined in chapter 2. After formulating the
problem, some basic methods of deriving efficient "policy" solutions are described.
After this the use of partially observable Markov decision processes (POMIDPs) to model
uncertain modes is discussed, along with a basic POMDP solution method. Finally, some
considerations about humans in the system are discussed.
Chapter 5 uses an aircraft collision avoidance alerting process to illustrate MDP
alerting concepts. A policy is derived that defines the alerting threshold and also
generates guidance to maximize safety after the alert. The modeling of alerting
preferences in terms of a reward function is shown. Finally, the need for average as well
as threshold'performance metrics (utilities) is discussed.
Chapter 6 uses a more complex, 2-mode collision avoidance alerting process to
look at modeling uncertain modes and updating of uncertain knowledge based on
observations. The benefit of such modeling is shown using specific scenarios and metrics
of average performance. Finally, the use of belief state domain simplifications is
discussed.
In Chapter 7 the main conclusions and contributions are summarized.
21
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2. Probabilistic Alerting Overview and
Thesis Motivation
This chapter describes in detail two new concepts for guiding the design of
probabilistic alerting systems. One is belief modeling of uncertain mode variables. This
is a method for describing uncertainty about which of multiple dynamic modes an
observed system is in. Another is anticipating future information gathering and decision
opportunities when choosing an alerting system action. Section 2.1 describes the alerting
process and modeling assumptions in general. Then section 2.2 covers the different
measures of alerting system performance. In section 2.3 the use of probabilistic
trajectory prediction to define the alerting logic and achieve specific performance
requirements is discussed. This leads into an argument in section 2.4 for the importance
of mode belief modeling and for considering future decisions when making the current
alerting decision.
2.1 Probabilistic Alerting Process Model
2.1.1 Components and Influences
Figure 2.1 depicts the alerting process using the notation of multivariable systems
theory. Blocks represent physical elements, and arrows indicate the influences they have
on one another. An element that changes with time is characterized by a set of variables
called the state vector or state of the element. For example, the state of an n-variable
element at time t is:
The process and hazard model and the terminology described in this chapter are similar to those used by
Kuchar (Kuchar, 1995; Kuchar, 1996).
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x(t) = [ x1(t) x2(t) ... xn(t) ]T
Scalars, including time and the state variables, are italicized, while vectors are in
boldface. This is the convention throughout this thesis. Another notational practice is to
sometimes truncate the labels of parameters with understood dependencies: e.g. x(t)
represented by x.
Human
Disturbances
dh(t)
Situation state: s(t) = { Xh(t), xp(t) }
Plant
Disturbances
as u(M) Plant dp(t)
----------------------------------
Figure 2.1: Alerting Process
The alerting system, represented by the leftmost element, is a dynamic system
with a state, Xa.2 It makes observations 0 and sends inputs a to some situation composed
of humans and a plant they control. The humans and plant are both dynamic systems
with state vectors Xh and xp respectively. The situation is itself a dynamic system with an
overall state vector S, made up of the human and plant states. For a physical example,
the situation might be highway traffic, including multiple human drivers, their vehicles,
and the road they travel on. In that case, the humans are in one block, and the vehicles
and road form the plant.
2 For example, the alerting system state could be an estimate of the current situation state.
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(2.1)
The humans make observations y of the plant and perform actions u to control it.
The observations y and 0 are the output of a sensors element. This element is a function
of s that describes which part of the plant state is actually observable to the humans and
the alerting system. Sensors may also provide information about the humans themselves,
as shown. The humans receive an alerting system signal a, which can include both
discrete alert values (alerts in the conventional sense) and any continuous resolution
guidance the alerting system might provide.
Imperfections in the situation model result in observed state dynamics different
from what is expected from the model. Such errors are represented in the diagram by
disturbance and noise inputs. The human and plant models are subject to disturbances,
dh and dp respectively, each a vector the same size as the corresponding state. The
sensor outputs y and o are corrupted by random noise that can include bias and high
frequency noise components. This is shown as the input vector ns, which is the
combined size of the two sensor outputs.
Note that even though humans are ultimately controlling the plant, the model
presented here focuses on the effects of the alerting system on the overall situation
(human and plant). In a sense, from the alerting system's point of view, the human and
plant can be collectively considered as the controlled element. The design issues then
revolve around how to design the alerting system so that the human and plant system
responds in an acceptable manner.
2.1.2 Incidents and Hazards
The state s changes with time according to the internal situation dynamics and the
effects of any alerting system input to the situation. The purpose of the alerting system is
to protect against an incident by influencing the path s takes in its space, S. The space S
is the set of all possible states and is termed the situation space. An incident is some
negative event that can happen within the situation, such as an accident, rule violation or
mechanical failure.
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As the state changes with time, there is some probability of an incident happening
over a given interval traveled. The probability is different for different paths that s can
take, as figure 2.2 shows for a 2-dimensional state space. From the current state s(tc)
S 2
s 1(t1 )
T1
S(t)
P(Incident IT1) = P1
P(Incident I T2 ) = P 2
S
S1
Figure 2.2: Incident Dependence on the Situation Trajectory
two future paths (Ti and T2) are possible, beginning at the current state and continuing
through time t1. Each path has a different incident probability. A complete description of
the situation must include a model specifying these probabilities. The model should give
incident probabilities for any possible future path segment beginning at any possible s.
A common approach is to specify a hazardous region or hazard space within S, and
assume an incident happens with probability 1 if the state trajectory enters hazard space,
and 0 otherwise. Figure 2.3 illustrates this kind of incident model in the 2-variable state
Hazard
if Incident
s~)trajectory
S
S1
Figure 2.3: Example Incident Model
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space, with H labeling the hazard space. These incident modeling issues were identified
and discussed in more detail by Kuchar (Kuchar, 1995).
2.1.3 Situation Dynamics
The situation is assumed to have uncertain dynamics. That is, knowledge of s at
a given time does not allow an exact prediction of future states. It is further assumed that
the uncertainty is amenable to probabilistic modeling. In terms of the variables already
defined, this means that, given S at the current time to, the state after some time interval
At for a known control input Ta (a trajectory of a(t)) over that interval is known within
some probability distribution over the states in S. The dynamics can be expressed as a
distribution T(.,.) conditioned on the initial state and control trajectory:
s(to+At) = T(s(to), Ta) (2.2)
This future-state distribution is called the transition function (Russell & Norvig). Note
that the distribution of the future state has no dependence on states prior to s(to). In other
words, the assumption is that no information affecting the prediction is lost by forgetting
past states. By satisfying this condition, the state S is said to exhibit the Markov
property, in the probabilistic sense of the term (Russell & Norvig).
The value of a(t), chosen by the alerting system, could be a real-valued vector in
general, but in practice is sometimes limited to a small set of possibilities:
a(t) e { ao, a1 , a2, ... an } (2.3)
This may.be preferable or necessary due to limitations of the alerting display, or in a
human's ability to track and follow a command signal (Wickens, 1992). For example, in
an impending car accident scenario where the time to predicted collision is short, a hard
braking command might be more realistic than complicated instructions to steer around
an obstacle. Since a hazard alerting system is meant for rare interventions only, one
possible action is the nominal or deferral action, which is really the lack of an alert. The
deferral action is represented by ao.
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Figure 2.4 illustrates probabilistic prediction uncertainty for a situation with a
known current state and some implied control signal beginning at t. While s(tc) is
known exactly, s(tc+At) has a distribution of possible states, with darker shading
indicating a greater likelihood of the state being at that point. An effect of the trajectory
uncertainty is that whether or not future events happen-such as crossing through hazard
space-is also uncertain. For the process shown, there is some probability of the state
being inside H at each point in time, and a probability of S passing through H over all
time. These could be calculated numerically, such as with Monte Carlo simulation, if not
analytically.
S2
Distribution of
S(tc) s(tc+At)
S
S1
Figure 2.4: Probabilistic Prediction Uncertainty
The probabilistic dynamics and Markov state assumptions are consistent with
existing methods of design and analysis of alerting systems (Carpenter & Kuchar, 1997;
Yang & Kuchar, 1997, 2002; Kuchar, 1996). While such modeling applies to alerting
logic analysis, more relevant to this thesis are design methods where the alerting decision
logic is defined in terms of decision metrics computed from a probabilistic prediction
model. The reasoning behind such an approach is that it can lead more directly to a logic
with the desired performance than trial and error design methods (Yang & Kuchar, 2002).
2.1.4 Situation Observability
To determine how decision options will affect future events, the alerting system
uses available knowledge about the current situation state. It may not know the exact
state, but have limited information that some states are more likely than others. The less
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uncertainty there is, the more accurate predictions can be and the more effective its
decisions are likely to be. When state uncertainty is large, the alerting system can reduce
it by incorporating information from new observations o of the situation into its existing
knowledge. An observation is a direct measurement of the current situation (e.g. reading
a thermometer or other sensor of a physical quantity) (Russell & Norvig).
An ideal observation provides sufficient information to determine the exact and
entire current value of s. When this is possible, the state is said to befully observable
(Russell & Norvig). There is no requirement that the variables in s be directly measured.
It may be more convenient or realistic to measure a different vector 0 that can be
transformed into the value of s. For example, in figure 2.5 the relative position of the
two aircraft might be defined as one pair of variables { xm, ym } (2.5a), but easier to
determine by measuring a different, equivalent, pair { r, 0 } (2.5b) that can be
transformed into the other variables.
(a) (b)
y y
Ym -------------- S{ X, y}
ro ={ r,06}r
0/
-'X XxmxXm
Figure 2.5: State-Observation Relationship
As mentioned in section 2.1.1, an ideal observation of the state is not always
possible. One reason is that imperfect sensors can add random measurement errors. The
uncertainty due to such errors is often modeled in terms of probability distributions over
the space of o or observation space, 0. This kind of observation uncertainty is pictured
in figure 2.6a, assuming no state knowledge beforehand (i.e. a uniform state distribution
on the X-y plane).
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(b) Missing Sensor
y y
Actual state Actual state
r /
X0 /
Figure 2.6: Sources of Observation Uncertainty
Even without measurement error, full observability can fail to hold if there are too
few variables in 0 to determine the current S. For example, in figure 2.6b the observation
is reduced to 0 = { r }, with r exactly measurable and 0 unmeasurable, resulting in a locus
of possible states all equally likely. Effectively, the measurement error of 0 is uniformly
distributed if there was no prior knowledge about the variable. If either missing-sensor or
sensor-error uncertainty limit the observation, the state is termed partially observable
(Russell & Norvig).
Assuming 0 consists of measured variables with probabilistic error uncertainty,
the relationship between the current state and observation of the state is denoted by the
sensor function (Russell & Norvig):
O(to) = O(s(to)) (2.4)
The function O(-) is a probability distribution over the space of possible measurements 0,
conditional on the current state, s(tc).
2.2 Alerting System Performance
There are three main aspects of alerting system performance: the system's ability
to avoid unsuccessful alerts, unnecessary alerts and improper alerts.
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(a) Sensor Error
An unsuccessful alert is defined as any alert that is followed by an incident (Yang
& Kuchar, 1997). An example would be receiving a collision warning so late that there is
not enough time to actually avoid a collision (a late alert (LA)).
An unnecessary alert (UA) occurs when no incident would have occurred had
there been no alert (Yang & Kuchar, 1997). This category is relevant because, in calling
for an avoidance response, an unnecessary alert interferes with the human operator's
achievement of goals, such as maximizing productivity or minimizing time-to-completion
of a task. In addition, an unnecessary alert can actually lead to an incident (an induced
incident (H) (Carpenter & Kuchar, 1997)) that would not have happened otherwise. For
example, in maneuvering to avoid an incorrectly predicted collision with one car, a driver
could crash into another. Note that a successful alert can be either necessary or
unnecessary: these alerts are not mutually exclusive events.
An improper alert (IA) is an alerting system action perceived as erroneous by a
human operator. This could happen for different reasons. For example, the alert might
be known or believed to be unnecessary or premature (a nuisance alert (NA)). Another
possibility is that the alert is issued later than preferred (or not at all). Improper alerts,
particularly nuisance alerts, are a problem because experiencing these over time can
cause an operator to mistrust the alerting system and become less likely to conform to
alerts and guidance. This issue was studied in the context of aircraft collision avoidance
by Pritchett (Pritchett & Hansman, 1997). In principle, an improper alert can also be an
unnecessary alert, an unsuccessful alert, both, or neither. Figure 2.7 illustrates the
possible interdependencies of the three error events with a Venn diagram. Drawn this
way, an ideal alerting system would never operate inside the ellipses: every alert would
be proper, necessary and successful. But as will be discussed, a more realistic goal is not
to achieve an ideal alerting system, but one with an acceptable trade-off between different
error types.
Whereas unsuccessful and unnecessary alerts are clearly and objectively defined,
improper alerts are more ambiguous because of the difficulty of understanding or
predicting operator preferences. By some means, however, they must be addressed, and
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preferably at an early stage in design. Otherwise, they will have to be dealt with through
trial and error with test subjects or user feedback.
Figure 2.7: Alerting Performance Aspects
Alerting system performance can be quantified using probabilities or frequencies
of the three error events. The frequencies of unnecessary alerts and incidents
(unsuccessful alerts3) in particular are common metrics of overall performance. The
performance of the alerting system in a given trajectory scenario can be described in
terms of the conditional probabilities of the different events at the time of the alert:
P( Unsuccessful Alert S is at Threshold)
P( Unnecessary Alert s is at Threshold)
P( Improper Alert Is is at Threshold)
(2.5)
(2.6)
(2.7)
For any of the error events it is best to have a low probability or frequency, but
due to uncertainty in the situation dynamics, it is usually impossible to optimize all
metrics at the same time. For instance, adjusting the logic to minimize the probability of
an unnecessary alert tends to increase the probability of an unsuccessful alert,
necessitating a trade-off between the two. One way to visualize this trade-off is with a
System Operating Characteristic (SOC) plot as in figure 2.8 (Kuchar 1995, 1996).
3 If an incident happens before there is an alert, the alert can be thought of as happening at the time of the
incident-{ 0, 0 1 (Winder & Kuchar, 1999).
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Ideal operating point Operating point at time t
SOC curve
Improvmng
performance
P(Successful Alert j S is at Threshold)
0 '
0 1
P(Unnecessary Alert S is at Threshold)
Figure 2.8: System Operating Characteristic Plot
A point on the SOC plane is a plot of the successful alert probability (1 minus the
unsuccessful alert probability) against the unnecessary alert probability at a given time.
The operating point at the moment an alert is triggered (when S is at the threshold) is a
measure of alerting performance for that particular scenario. The curve shown
corresponds to a hypothetical situation trajectory that ends in an incident along the
nominal trajectory if no alert ever occurs. The point traces a path from the upper right
corner toward the left as the incident becomes increasingly likely. If evasive action is
taken early on, the probability of avoiding the incident is high, as is the probability that
the alert is unnecessary. As the alert is deferred, the probability that it would be safe or
unnecessary decreases. Ultimately, if the alert is deferred for too long, the incident
becomes unavoidable due to the limitations of escape options, and the operating point
goes to (0, 0). The ideal place for an alert to occur is at the upper left corner, where the
alert is known to be necessary and there is no chance of an incident when the alert occurs.
Realistic systems tend not to occupy this point, but a designer may try to achieve alerting
points as near to it as possible (Yang & Kuchar, 1997). The nearness that can be
achieved depends on the predictability of the situation and the effectiveness of escape
options.
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For SOC points below the diagonal line an alert would be more likely to cause a
collision than prevent one. At the diagonal the alerting system is equally likely to cause a
collision as prevent one. So at minimum, alerts should occur over the diagonal.
An SOC plot can also be used as an analysis tool to help visualize the overall
performance of an alerting system (Winder & Kuchar, 1999). Whereas in the previous
discussion the SOC point was an incident probability at the threshold, the coordinates can
also be defined as the global successful and unnecessary alert averages resulting from a
set of alerting process trajectories. This use will be important in later chapters.
2.3 Probabilistic Prediction-Based Alerting
Figure 2.9 redraws the alerting process with the alerting system's inner process
broken down into two phases: belief state updating and the action logic.
Figure 2.9: Alerting System Structure
2.3.1 Belief State Updating
The Belief Updating block is a process of assimilating the stream of observations
of the situation into a probability distribution, bs(t), describing the overall uncertainty of
the current state. Even if each observation has great uncertainty due to the reasons
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described earlier, the combined evidence of many observations over time, plus
knowledge about the nature of observation errors, of the situation dynamics, and of
alerting actions taken, will tend to reduce current-state uncertainty. Because probabilistic
state uncertainty can also be thought of as the knowledge or reasonable beliefs about the
state, the distribution be is called the belief state (Russell & Norvig).
Probability theory describes the process of incorporating evidence into the belief
state ("filtering " (Russell & Norvig)) using the sensor and transition functions that were
defined in section 2.1. This process is described in appendix A. Thus, these two
functions are included in figure 2.9 as inputs to the belief updating process, along with
the observations and past alerting actions. Depending on the situation, belief filtering can
be a computationally intensive and time-consuming process. But for special cases of the
sensor and transition functions, efficient numerical algorithms exist that make hardware
implementation of the process more practical. For example, Kalman filtering is a
common technique that produces a valid state distribution when sensor errors are
Gaussian noise and the state dynamics can be expressed as linear equations. Such
algorithms are common in alerting system design.
2.3.2 Performance Metric-Based Alerting
The Action Logic in figure 2.9 uses the current belief state and the prediction
model to choose an alerting action. As shown, it can also take the previous action as an
input. Most of the time the alerting system operates in the background, monitoring the
state for conditions that justify an alert. During that time the action logic should suggest
a deferral action, ao (section 2.1.3), because intervention is not yet warranted. Once an
alert happens, the logic continues to monitor the state, now using gathered information to
best guide the human operators in avoiding an incident.
In prediction-based alerting, the logic chooses its actions based on the relative
quality of predicted outcomes for each option. The option that would have the best result
(according to some value scheme) is chosen over the others. Predicting outcomes
requires the current-state distribution and the state transition model. The incident model,
introduced in section 2.1.2, is also required at this stage. As they are determined by
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probabilistic process model components, outcome predictions are themselves
probabilistic quantities. For example, for a particular sequence of actions it is possible to
calculate the probabilities of future events such as hazard encounters, or the probability
that an alert issued now would be an unnecessary alert.
As discussed in section 2.2, such probabilities are basic measures of the
performance of the alerting threshold. When these quantities are computed in real time
within the alerting system, and known at the time an alert happens, the performance of
the threshold for that scenario is directly controllable with the decision. For example, in
Figure 2.10 an airborne alerting system monitors the nominal probability of crashing into
1
Pull Up!3
Alert threshold
P(Necessary Alert s is at Threshold)
time
1 2 3
Figure 2.10: Performance Metric Threshold
a mountain, and defers alerting until reaching a threshold probability that the alert is
needed to avert a collision. Generally there are requirements on safety of the escape
maneuver (successful alert probability) too, so that there may be a defined region in the
SOC space where alerts are acceptable if they occur, and outside of which they are not.
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The idea of probabilistic prediction-based hazard avoidance alerting is to define the
alerting logic directly in terms of predictive metrics such as these, and the path they take
through the metric space, as figure 2.11 illustrates (Yang & Kuchar, 1997, 2002).
Region of acceptable alert performance
Issue alert
P(Successful Alert j S is at Threshold)
0
0 1
P(Unnecessary Alert S is at Threshold)
Figure 2.11: SOC Alert Threshold
2.4 New Design Considerations
This thesis looks at two new design considerations for prediction-based alerting,
and their effects on performance. In this section the considerations are identified, and
their anticipated importance is explained in relation to current design practices.
2.4.1 Mode Beliefs
The situation state, s, was described in section 2.1 as a set of variables that
satisfies the Markov property, so that probabilistic predictions can be made based on the
current state. These are most often real-valued variables representing physical quantities
like distance or speed. Another kind of variable, termed a mode, is of particular interest
in this thesis. A mode is a variable having a discrete domain, and whose value tends to
persist over long intervals of time. The mode serves to index a set of distinct behaviors
that the situation can exhibit at different times. These can be expressed as a set of
transition functions (expression 2.8), one for each possible mode, mi. For example,
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figure 2.12 redraws the terrain collision scenario from chapter 1 in probabilistic form.
Though future states are uncertain in either mode, in one the aircraft will nominally tend
to crash into the mountain, and in the other it will tend to climb over it, as separate
probabilistic transition functions can describe. In general, a mode's value at a given time
can be a deterministic function of inputs or other state variables (e.g. an autopilot tracking
mode at a known setting), or a random process (e.g. pilot mental lapse, weather
conditions). The mode can be observable or unobservable by the alerting system, but
only the latter case is of interest in this thesis.
T,(s(to), Ta), mi = m1 (2.8)
s(tc+A t) = T2 (s(tc), Ta), M2
Tn(s(Wc, Ta), ... ma
tc+At
tctc t
Figure 2.12: Transition Function Indexing with a Mode Variable
When there are mode variables in the situation state, the filtering process
described in section 2.3 still applies, resulting in a belief state description of mode
uncertainty. In this case the belief state is a discrete probability distribution. Even if no
direct measurement of a mode variable is possible, the estimation process will infer
information about the mode through its known influence on the transition function. This
is similar to using a filter to estimate speed from repeated position measurements when
speed is not directly measurable: the equation relating the two allows observations of one
to improve knowledge about the other.
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The action logic part of the alerting system uses the total belief state at the current
time, bs(t), to make predictions for each possible alerting action. Note that there are two
contributors of uncertainty in predicted states: current-state uncertainty (the belief state)
and inherent prediction uncertainty due to the transition function. The uncertainty of the
predicted state increases with an increase in either component. Figure 2.13 shows the
effect of increasing belief state uncertainty on the distribution of predicted states. In a
case where the uncertainty contribution of one source is small, neglecting that uncertainty
(i.e. replacing the distribution with a single assumed value) may have little effect on the
overall prediction uncertainty, and be a reasonable approximation to make. This
simplification is commonly done with the output of filtering processes, where the
intention is usually to find a best estimate of the state value rather than a full uncertainty
description. For example, the mean value or maximum-likelihood value of the belief
state might be taken as the estimate.
(a) Exact Current State (b) Uncertain Current State
X X
/
bs(to) bs(tc)
Y Y
Figure 2.13: Effect of Current-State Uncertainty on Predictions
As figure 2.14 illustrates, with a 1-dimensional state, that a distribution with a
sufficiently small variance (2.14a) can ensure that errors due to a state approximation
nearly always remain within specified bounds of acceptability. If the filtering process
leaves large enough uncertainties in the state, as with the broad distribution in (2.14b),
state estimation error becomes unacceptable.
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As with continuous variables, a maximum-likelihood approximation can be used
to estimate a mode from its distribution. This means assuming that the present mode is
the one with the highest probability. This assumed mode can then be used to predict
future outcomes, which might allow easier decision metric computation or even
avoidance of computations if certain modes are known in advance to be safe or unsafe.
This suggests a specialized version of the alerting process where the alerting decision is
based on a hypothesis test on the current mode belief state rather than on explicit
prediction of the future effects of the current state.
(a) (b)
bs(s) bs(s)
Belief State Belief State
J; 
4 
Error
S S
Belief State Mean Actual State Belief State Mean Actual State
Figure 2.14: State Approximations
Because belief updating can be complicated and slow in some cases, another
inclination might be to avoid the Bayes updating process by leaving the belief state or
part of the belief state (over some but not all uncertain variables) fixed at a single
distribution. This could be a viable option in some cases, if the simplifications are
justifiable using known transition and sensor function properties.
2.4.2 Anticipating Knowledge Gain and Decision Opportunities
Up to now the only assumptions about the action logic of the alerting system are
that it makes use of a current belief state for the situation, an incident model and
probabilistic state predictions to generate metrics for comparing possible actions. Based
on existing alerting methods there are different ways to proceed. These will be described
and compared next, along with a new method of planning with possible benefits over the
existing options.
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The simplest way to use state predictions in planning is to base action choices on
the predicted outcomes of one or more maneuvers. A maneuver policy will refer to a
predetermined control law that maps any belief state, b,, into an alert action, a. A
maneuver is the state trajectory resulting from repeatedly using a single maneuver policy
to generate the alerting action. Figure 2.15 illustrates the maneuver idea for the extreme
case (for simplicity) of no prediction or current-state uncertainty. The maneuvers shown
include the nominal maneuver (N), where the maneuver policy is to take the nominal
action regardless of be, and possible escape maneuvers (Ei). Each escape maneuver
policy, when used repeatedly, causes the system to seek some state goal. For example,
one maneuver policy for an aircraft could involve achieving a certain heading or climb
rate, so repeated use of the maneuver would cause convergence to that goal.
S2
N
s(to)
< 
E1
S E 2
S1
Figure 2.15: Planning with Maneuvers
For each maneuver there is some probability of an incident occurring. The action
decision is made by optimizing or satisficing a cost function defined in terms of the
probabilities of future events. For example, prior to any alert the rule might be to issue
the alert if the probability of an incident along the nominal trajectory exceeds some
threshold (as in figure 2.10). Or, it could be based on a maximum allowable probability
of an incident for the available escape maneuvers, where reaching a minimum safety
level triggers the alert, as done in (Carpenter & Kuchar, 1997). It could also be a rule
using both nominal and escape maneuver predictions.
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After an alert happens, the simplest approach is to use the safest maneuver, and
cease any further planning. Then there are no further choices to make, and the resulting
probability of an incident will be as predicted at the time of the alert for that maneuver.
For the most predictable evasion performance, the maneuver may take the form of an
understood procedure the human operators rehearse, so that no display or interpretation
of complex guidance is needed after the alert (e.g. evacuation procedures for fire alarms
in a building). In aviation alerting this was assumed during development of the AILS
collision avoidance logic for close parallel approaches (Winder & Kuchar, 1999;
Samanant et al, 2000), where the tactical nature of the alerts made quick and precise
execution of escape maneuvers important.
A more flexible use of maneuver policies is allowing the alerting system to switch
between maneuvers (replan) even after an alert occurs. This gives the alerting system
greater freedom in acting to attain its objectives, but the method of choosing the next
action becomes less clear. Probably the most obvious approach is to choose the
maneuver resulting from a fixed maneuver policy assumption as before, but to repeat the
decision at later times, each time using the maneuver policy for the maneuver that is
predicted to be safest. This could result in a sequence of maneuver segments such as
shown in figure 2.16. Note that there is an inconsistency in assuming that the maneuver
S2  Fixed Maneuver 1
Maneuver 1
Maneuver 1
S(tc) Maneuver 2
S
S1
Figure 2.16: Replanning with Maneuvers
policy is fixed when in fact it can be changed later (the fixed-maneuver logic of figure
2.15 has this same inconsistency, since choosing the nominal maneuver does not actually
force a nominal trajectory to be followed in the future). However, the escape maneuver
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replanning method can still decrease the probability of an incident over that of the fixed-
maneuver planning method once an alert has occurred, making it a safer method while
not increasing the unnecessary alert rate. The method has been used in alerting
systems-for example, by the TCAS logic in the post-alert phase (RTCA, 1983; Harman,
1989).
Figure 2.17 shows the difference between safety as computed using a fixed-
maneuver assumption, and the more realistic safety probability the alerting system would
predict if it were able to take future decisions into account. The more accurate
knowledge would have an impact the alerting decision at to, possibly causing the alert to
be deferred longer than it would be otherwise. This would reduce the unnecessary alert
probability, assuming the SOC trajectory continued moving leftward.
Actual safety (time to)
Error
P(Successful Alert s is at Threshold)
Computed safety (t,)
0
0 1
P(Unnecessary Alert I S is at Threshold)
Figure 2.17: Error in Computed Safety
Another important observation to make is that if the alerting system has only
uncertain knowledge of the situation state (a belief state), then taking future decisions
into account in probability calculations also requires considering future belief states.
This is because at future points in time the alerting system will have made additional
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observations of the situation, and as a result it will have gained new information that will
affect the decision made at that time.
If it can be done, this kind of probability estimate would enable decision making
that is more rational and potentially better than others in that, to achieve a specific goal,
the decision maker uses more of the information available in the alerting process model
and from observations than in simpler methods. Methods currently available for solving
this kind of decision problem are described in Markov decision process (MDP) theory,
and will be applied later in this thesis. This is a novel approach to designing hazard
avoidance alerting systems, because existing probabilistic prediction-based logics tend to
use the simpler maneuver-based methods.
An issue that comes up and will be addressed later is that this most general
method of probabilistic planning has the potential to be more complex numerically, and
too difficult to carry out in real time with trajectory simulation-based methods like Monte
Carlo simulation.
2.4.3 Strategy to Avoid Improper Alerts
For the alerting system to be accepted by its users, it should avoid significant
numbers of nuisance alerts. Ideally it would avoid all improper alerts, meaning operators
would agree with its actions in all scenarios (section 2.2). The design process should
include a strategy for minimizing such alerts.
An alerting system's improper alert tendencies are usually detected and
eliminated in a process of trial and error, using simulations or other tests along with
human judgment. Because improper alerts are inherently subjective, it is unclear how to
control them directly through definition of the alerting threshold and avoidance logic.
Assumptions are sometimes made, at least implicitly, that improper alerts are closely
related to unnecessary alerts, so that minimizing unnecessary alerts also minimizes
nuisance alerts. Assuming this relationship is true, it still does not provide a means of
avoiding delayed alerts that could also be considered improper.
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In this thesis an assumption is made that a more general and complete description
is needed of what causes improper alerts, and this description should guide the basic
definition of the alerting threshold. Part of the motive for a decision theoretic approach
to alerting is an hypothesis that, by approximating a rational decision process and basing
it on goals compatible with operator preferences, an alerting logic will tend to avoid
improper alerts. This notion will be discussed in more detail in chapter 4.
2.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter described the basic ideas of probabilistic prediction-based alerting as
it is typically done, and then argued the need for certain improvements in design: mode
uncertainty modeling and accounting for future decision opportunities.
First the alerting process was described in mathematical terms. The alerting
system can be though of as a controller of a situation made up of human operators and a
plant they interact with. States of dynamic process elements are expressed as state
vectors, and the overall situation has a state S. The dynamics of S are described by a
probabilistic transition function T(s(to), Ta), which is the conditional distribution of
possible next states resulting from a given alert signal Ta and current state s(to). The
alerting system makes observations of the situation through the probabilistic sensor
function O(s(to)), which is the conditional distribution of possible measurements o of the
current state.
The fundamental aspects of alerting system performance were reviewed. There
are three types of error that an alerting system can make: unsuccessful alerts,
unnecessary alerts and improper alerts. An unsuccessful alert is one where an alert is
followed by an incident, either because the alert was too late or because it actually caused
an incident that would not have happened otherwise (an induced incident). An
unnecessary alert is one where the alert is not necessary to prevent an incident, and
results in an unneeded evasion maneuver or an induced incident. An improper alert is an
outcome where a human operator feels an alert is incorrect-either too early or too late-
and can harm operator conformance to alerts over time.
45
Next, the use of probabilistic state filtering in alerting systems was discussed,
followed by how probabilistic performance metrics are used to define the alerting
threshold.
Finally, new decision considerations were discussed in relation to current
methods, with the overall aim of increasing the amount of available information that is
applied to the decision. One is the possibility of using belief state filtering to model
uncertainty of dynamic modes. Another is the use of information about future decision
options, including possible future belief states, to make more informed alerting decisions,
both at the threshold and during the evasion guidance phase. Finally, a short discussion
of improper alert reduction as a goal of design was included. The need was stressed for
use of an improper alert model early in the design to minimize trial and error improper
alert reduction later.
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3. Related Work
This research concerns methods for designing tactical hazard avoidance alerting
systems of the kind increasingly used in aviation safety applications. These systems are
characterized by their use as backup safety devices for infrequent hazards, numerous
input state variables, complex alert signals such as staged alerts and dynamically
generated resolution guidance, and multiple dynamic modes in the monitored situation.
This thesis will apply methods from Markov decision Process (MDP) theory to such
systems to guide design and improve performance. Figure 3.1 illustrates the relationship
This research
Reynolds, Hwang et al
Figure 3.1: Related Research
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of this problem to broader existing areas of research. The following sections give an
overview of the most closely related work, sharing two or more of the large categories
and identified in the diagram with shading.
3.1 Time-Critical Hazard Alerting Systems
Existing alerting system designs can be divided roughly into three categories:
conformance-based, simple trajectory-based and complex trajectory-based.
Conformance-based alerting systems operate under the reasoning that abnormal
system behavior justifies an alert. An example is the Precision Runway Monitor (PRM)
alerting system for preventing collisions during closely spaced parallel runway
approaches (Shank, 1994). In this case alerts are triggered when a radar-tracked aircraft
crosses into a "no transgression zone" separating two approach paths, as in figure 3.2.
NoT~a~ ,,es- ~Z"n
Alert triggered
Figure 3.2: PRM Conformance-Based Alerting Threshold
Such an alerting system has no inherent tendency to avoid unnecessary alerts (where no
incident would occur without the alert). For example, PRM would trigger an alert even if
there were no aircraft in the adjacent approach path to be endangered.
A more sophisticated type of logic is simple trajectory-based alerting. In this
method alerts are triggered through a combination of a rough state prediction model and
incident proximity criteria. For example, the TCAS aircraft collision avoidance system
uses range and time threshold criteria along with an assumption of constant range rate. In
such an alerting system there may be several threshold parameters that must be tuned to
give acceptable performance in terms of unnecessary alerts and safety. Other examples
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of this type of alerting in aviation are the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS)
terrain avoidance logic and Airborne Information for Lateral Spacing (AILS) logic for
parallel approach collision avoidance.
Complex trajectory-based alerting uses a more realistic trajectory model and
threshold criteria that are stated directly in terms of alerting performance requirements.
An example is the parallel approach logic by Teo & Tomlin (2003) that triggers alerts
according to worst-case safety requirements for escape maneuvers. More common are
alerting logics that use probabilistic state prediction models and decision metrics. At
MIT logics have been developed (Carpenter & Kuchar; Yang & Kuchar, 2002) using
probabilistic safety and unnecessary alert performance metrics (P(Successful Alert) and
P(Unnecessary Alert)) to define the alerting threshold.
Of these three alerting approaches, the Markov decision process alerting method
described in this thesis is most similar to complex trajectory-based alerting with
probabilistic modeling and decision metrics. This is because it too uses explicit
probabilistic prediction modeling and probabilistic decision metrics to define the logic. It
is distinct, however, in that existing approaches have not made use of probabilistic mode
uncertainty models or information about possible future decisions. Alerting logics
typically involve continuous or observable state variables, and decision metrics are
computed with an assumption that a fixed control sequence will be followed.
3.2 Hazard Avoidance with Mode Modeling
An overlapping area of research concerns hazard avoidance using uncertain mode
modeling, which includes more strategic forms of detection and avoidance.
At MIT recent attention has been given to conformance monitoring as an
approach to avoiding incidents in an airspace environment (Reynolds & Hansman). In
this work a fault detection approach was used to judge whether aircraft were conforming
or not to an expected path. As with conformance-based tactical alerting systems such as
PRM, the driving philosophy in this case is that detection of abnormal system behavior
justifies intervention. This point of view is consistent with the current air traffic control
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system, where aircraft in controlled airspace are monitored continuously for deviations as
they fly along pre-approved routes.
The Markov decision process alerting method differs from this in two main ways.
One is that fault detection results in a conclusion that the system is in a specific mode,
whereas with the MDP method mode probabilities are maintained and used to weight the
outcomes predicted for the different possible modes. Another difference is that in the
MDP case alerting decisions depend on predicted final outcomes, whereas interventions
are justified by the mode in a fault detection method.
There are other mode-based hazard avoidance methods more similar to MDP
alerting in that they use state prediction and mode probability updating. An MIT group
(Yang et al, 2004) has applied mode uncertainty modeling and estimation to automotive
collision avoidance. Probabilities are computed in real time for a number of possible
dynamic models (modes) using a multiple Kalman filter approach. A mode estimate is
determined from this and used with a hazard prediction model to choose the alerting
action. Another method recently suggested (Hwang et al, 2003) for aircraft conflict
detection combines mode estimation with a probabilistic trajectory prediction model to
estimate collision probabilities. The MDP approach proposed here differs from both of
these methods in that the mode probability distribution rather than a mode estimate taken
from the distribution is used in making predictions. Also, in the MDP approach
predictions will include information about future decisions yet to be made, whereas both
of these assume a predetermined control sequence will be followed, as described in
section 2.4.2.
3.3 Alerting with Markov Decision Processes
Markov decision processes have been applied in various decision aids such as
navigation advisors that continuously help users optimize their movements. They have
also been used for alerting applications.
One relevant case is an alarm system concept designed at Stanford to assist ICU
physicians in making optimal use of limited attention resources (Huang, 1999).
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Successive alerts would direct physicians to patients most urgently needing attention.
This application involved a fully observable Markov patient model, whereas the proposed
alerting application allows a partially observable state (uncertain modes).
Another related use of Markov decision processes is work by Horvitz with others
on designing MDP-based software agents to help humans accomplish tasks, including
during time-critical decision situations such as medical emergencies (Horvitz &
Rutledge, 1991; Horvitz & Seiver, 1997). One application combined Markov decision
processes with an uncertain user attention model to optimize the timing of email alerts
(Horvitz et al, 1999). This latter research is very similar to the proposed use of MDPs,
but differs in that the present work concerns time-critical hazard avoidance alerting and
specific issues for this kind of alerting, including escape guidance, uncertain dynamic
modes. In addition this thesis also discusses MDP-based alerting in the context of current
hazard alerting methods, including specific peformance measures such as P(SA), P(UA)
and improper alert rates, in order to point out differences and benefits.
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4. Alerting with Markov Decision Processes
4.1 Introduction
Richard Bellman introduced Markov decision processes in 1957 as a variant of his
more general "dynamic programming" theory of optimal control, itself based on work by
Hamilton and Jacobi in the 1800s (Sutton & Barto, 1998; Bellman 1957a,b). Dynamic
programming is a method of controlling dynamic systems to optimize some measure of
the state trajectory. A typical problem is controlling a vehicle's speed to minimize fuel
use on the way to a destination. A Markov decision process is such a problem where
time is discrete and the process dynamics exhibit probabilistic randomness. Since its
invention, the theory has been extended to allow probabilistic current-state uncertainty
due to limited observability. Such a process is termed a partially observable Markov
decision process (POMDP).
Markov decision processes have been applied in economics, operations research,
control systems design, and artificial intelligence (AI) among other areas. In Al research,
MDP theory has gained favor as a model of rational decision making in well-defined
circumstances where an intelligent agent's outcome preferences can be expressed as a
trajectory utility function (Russel & Norvig). This point of view is supported by the
success of MDP-based systems in complex reasoning tasks such as playing master-level
backgammon against humans (Tesauro, 1994). As demonstrated in that work, MIDPs can
sometimes be combined with reinforcement learning techniques to avoid the need to
directly define.utility and reward functions. Russell and Norvig (2003) give a good
introduction to MDPs from an Al point of view, and are the main resource for MDP
theory and terminology in this chapter. Other popular references include Bertsekas
(1987, 1995) and Puterman (1994).
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The purpose of this chapter is to give an overview of MDP theory in an alerting
systems context. Most of the needed components-the Markov state, probabilistic
dynamics and sensor functions-were introduced in chapter 2.
4.2 Problem Formulation
MIDP theory requires the alerting process to be modeled in discrete time. Time is
represented as a series of integers, k, where each k corresponds to a point in time, tk.
Hazard alerting processes are often discrete anyway, due to the nature of the hardware
implementation, which can involve digital computers and sensors with limited update
rates.
Figure 4.1: Markov Alerting Process
4.2.1 MDP Alerting Model
Figure 4.1 shows the
A basic process includes:
S, S
a, A
Markov alerting process model and necessary components.
Markov situation state and state space
Alerting actions and action space
Sk+1 = T(Sk, a) Probabilistic transition function describing the
distribution of next states within S due to a given
action from at the current state
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(4.1)
Ur(Sk, Sk+1, ... sn) Trajectory utility function defining the total utility (4.2)
of a state trajectory r, where n can be infinitely
large
The notation "Sk" is short for s(k). In a standard MDP as defined above, the state is
assumed to be fully observable. A more general version of the problem, called a partially
observable Markov decision process or POMDP, allows for an uncertain observation or
sensor function:
o, 0 Set of possible observations of the state
Ok = O(Sk) Probabilistic observation sensor function describing the (4.3)
distribution of observations within 0 for a given state.
In a sense any alerting problem is partially observable, since the sensors needed to
measure the state are imperfect, but in some cases a regular MDP model may be an
appropriate approximation. Systems with unobservable mode variables in the state will
likely need a POMDP model.
4.2.2 Trajectory Utility Function
In MY1DP theory the long-term priorities of the decision maker, in this case the
alerting system, are described by a trajectory utility function, U,(sk, SW.1, ... s,). This
function is a mapping of each possible system trajectory into scalar value, where the
larger the value, the more desirable the trajectory is. For any two outcomes (trajectories),
the one with the larger utility is preferred. In sequential decision making, each successive
action is chosen to maximize the overall utility of the trajectory, including the future
trajectory.
This definition of the utility function is a very general one, and to simplify the
problem an assumption can be made that the utility function is stationary: that it (and the
preferences it represents) stays constant with time. A consequence of the assumption is
that the utility function takes the form of a sum of rewards:
n
UT(Sk, Sk+1, .. sn) = R(Sk) + y R(sk+1) + y2 R(sk+2) +.. =,k y t-k R(st) (4.4)
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Here the R factors are rewards gained at each new state, and y is a discounting factor
between 0 and 1 that reduces the reward of future states progressively with projection
time. The discounting factor is included because in the case of n = coo (an infinite
horizon) a sum of non-discounted trajectory utilities could be infinite, in which case it
would be impossible to rank trajectories by utility as needed. In some cases a discounted
reward function may also better represent the priorities of the alerting system.
For the case of y = 1 the rewards are additive with no discounting. This is
allowable if the process has a finite time horizon. A finite horizon can be a reasonable
assumption where the potential for incidents exists over identifiable time intervals, such
as the time between when an alerting system begins tracking an intruder vehicle and
when it has safely passed.
The R function, or rewardfunction, can be though of as the most fundamental
expression of decision preferences, with U, being just a function of R. R is a constant
function that assigns an immediate reward to every possible state. To use the Markov
framework it will be necessary to describe the requirements of the alerting system in this
form, and this may partially dictate the choice of state variables. Figure 4.2 illustrates the
reward accumulation process for a 3-state discrete-time system, assuming no reward
discounting. Each time an action is taken, causing a transition to the next state, a reward
is gained.
s(k) s(k+1) s(k+2) s(k+3)
S R(s 1)
a(k) a(k+1)
a(k+2)
S2 R (S 2 )R(s 2)
S3 0
UT = R(s,) + R(s2) + R(s2 ) +
Figure 4.2: Reward Accumulation
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4.3 Expected Utility-Based Decisions
4.3.1 Maximum Expected Utility Principle
For a system with deterministic dynamics and a known state-where the-exact
trajectory and utility can be predicted for a sequence of actions-the preferred action at
any time is the one that would lead to the highest overall utility. Specifically, for the
trajectory utility function defined in section 4.2, the best action is the first action of the
sequence that maximizes the utility function. These ideal conditions often fail to hold in
realistic system models: current-state uncertainty, imperfect observability, and dynamic
uncertainty can make an exact utility prediction impossible. Instead, the utility of a given
action sequence becomes a random variable with a distribution of possible values,
making it impossible to say which next action maximizes utility.
In MIDP theory, and decision theory in general, the maximum expected utility
principle is used for decisions under uncertainty. It states that the preferred action is the
one producing the greatest expected (mean) outcome utility, rather than the best exact
utility:
ak: max E[ U(skl)] (4.5)
ak
Where ak is the preferred kth action and U(sk,1) is the maximum expected utility possible
at the next state, Sk+,1.
4.3.2 Expected Utility of States
With utility defined by expression 4.4, the action taken at each step should be the
one that maximizes the expected utility of the entire state trajectory. By the principle of
optimality, this also means that the action should maximize the expected utility of the
remaining future trajectory. Each state, then, can be thought of as having an associated
maximum expected utility4, U(s). That utility is given by the Bellman equation
4 The maximum expected utility of a state is sometimes referred to as the "utility" of the state for
convenience.
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ak
This says that the utility of the current state Sk is the reward that was gained at Sk plus the
discounted maximum expected utility of the following state, sk.1. Since (4.6) also
determines U(sk+1) from its following states, U(sk) could be calculated by recursively
applying (4.6) into the future, if not for the computational difficulties of doing so.
Computing the expected utility of an action in such a way is a difficult task.
Finding the expected utility of a given action requires knowing the maximum expected
utility of each possible next state (at worst the entire state space) over all possible actions,
so in the worst case the number of utility calculations (and amount of computing time)
increases in proportion to n' q(m4 ), where n is the number of possible states, q is the
number of available actions, and m is the number of action stages considered.5 The
increase in computations with the number of action stages is illustrated in figure 4.3 for
the 3-state system of figure 4.2, where m reaches 3. The number of possible state paths
s(k) s(k+1) s(k+2) s(k+3)
S1
2 3 = 27 possible paths
) 3= 9 possible paths
= 3 possible paths
Figure 4.3: Computing Expected Action Utility
increases according to nm. A single state path in the figure can correspond to more than
one sequence of actions, which further expands the number of possible distinct
cumulative reward scenarios. At this rate, going beyond a few time steps into the future
can quickly become too time and memory consuming to be feasible.
5 Using a limited number of steps into the future to compute expected utility presumes there is knowledge
or an acceptable approximation of the utility of the future-most states.
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(4.6)U(sk) = R(sk) + y rnax E[ U(sk.1) ]I
The mentioned number of possible utility scenarios is for the worst case, while in
reality simplifying assumptions are often reasonable. For example, prior constraints on
the form of action sequences can reduce the number of possibilities. In addition, state
transitions from a given initial state are typically limited to a small part of the state space
by nature of the dynamics.
Another way to limit computational complexity is to use approximation methods,
such as cutting off expected utility computations at a manageable number of steps and
using a heuristic approximation of maximum expected utility at that stage.
The complexity of computing utilities through recursive simulation is significant
because it can rule out numerical methods, such as Monte Carlo simulation, that are
possible with other alerting philosophies (Yang & Kuchar, 2002).
4.4 Policy Solutions
In general, any function that maps each state in S into a unique action is called a
policy and referenced by the 7 symbol:
a = it(s) (4.7)
The decision rule described in the previous section, based on maximizing expected
utility, does this and also ensures a utility-optimal action. An optimal policy is
distinguished with an asterisk
a* = 7E*(s) (4.8)
The optimal decision rule from section 4.3 would likely be too slow or inaccurate if
recursively simulated as described, and a better form would be desirable-for example,
this could be a table where pre-computed values can be quickly looked up at each state,
or a parameterized function with parameters computed offline.
One efficient policy generation method for the optimal policy is value iteration.
It follows from the fact that the maximum expected utility at each state, U(s), is related
59
to that of its neighboring states by the Bellman equation (4.6). If there are n states in S,
then there are n Bellman equations U(.) must simultaneously satisfy. Due to the
nonlinearity of the.Bellman equation there is no guaranteed analytical solution, but
iterative numerical methods often work. Starting with an arbitrary function U(-), the
Bellman equation is applied at every state in S to generate an updated utility function.
This is repeated until convergence of the utility function is achieved. Now, since all of
the next-state utilities are all known for any initial state, the policy can be found by
applying the maximum expected utility rule (4.5) with a 1-step look-ahead at each state.
Another efficient iterative method is policy iteration. Starting with some arbitrary
policy 7r, a utility function U(.) is generated by applying Bellman's equation at each state
in a manner similar to value iteration. Then an updated policy is generated using the
maximum expected utility rule with U(.). These two steps are repeated until the utility
function stops changing.
Both of these common policy generation methods are more efficient than the
recursive method described previously, with required memory proportional to nand
computation time increasing with n2 qc, where n is the size of S, q is the number of
actions, and C is the number of iterations. This is relatively manageable compared to the
exponentially increasing resource requirements for forward simulation utility estimation
for a single state.
A serious problem remains: the number of states in S can increase exponentially
with the number of state variables in the vector S. At worst, the total number of states is
the product of the domain sizes of all variables. Because of this, available computing
power puts a limit on the number state variables that can be used in the logic. It may be
possible to solve a large problem if some part of the domain can be discarded as unlikely
to be occupied of physically impossible.
In very large or continuous state spaces it may be necessary to use function
approximation methods to model U(.) to reduce the number of parameters that must be
computed and stored. For example, neural nets have been used for this purpose
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(Tesauro), along with training procedures for determining the necessary value function
parameters.
4.5 Partially Observable MDP Alerting
4.5.1 POMDP Solution Issues
Solution methods described in previous sections have assumed full observability
so that s is known exactly. When the state is only partially observable, so that a belief
state must be used, then any recursive prediction approach to calculating expected utility
of actions would also involve recursive prediction of future belief states. Or in other
words, the decision process requires an awareness of future belief states that could result
from different actions. For example, in an alerting problem involving uncertain modes,
the alerting system may decide to defer an alert in the knowledge that the mode
uncertainty will be reduced by coming events and observations, allowing greater
expected safety or a smaller unnecessary alert probability than an immediate alert.
The maximum expected utility for the partially observable case is no longer
described by the Bellman equation (4.6), so previously given policy solution methods do
not clearly apply. The standard approach to solving POMIDP problems is to view the
belief state as another state variable with its own state space. The belief state space
(belief space) is the set of probability distributions possible over the original state space
S. Viewed this way, the POMDP can be thought of as an MDP where the belief state
space replaces S as the state domain. Then standard MDP solutions apply.
A remaining challenge is that the belief state space must be indexed so that
solution algorithms can step systematically through the space. Another is that even if an
index scheme is found, the number of belief states that must be considered may be too
large for available methods to be practical, depending on the complexity of possible
belief distribution functions. Such POMDP solution issues are an active area of research.
The belief space can be thought of as a parameterized function over the domain S,
where varying the parameters allows the function to represent the entire range of belief
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states. Then, individual belief states correspond to particular parameter choices or
coordinates. This makes enumeration of the belief states straightforward. The fewer
parameters there are, and the more limited their ranges, the fewer belief states will likely
be needed to adequately cover a continuous belief space. This hints of the possibility of
approximating a complicated belief space with a reduced-order model, having fewer
parameters and needing fewer parameter combinations to span the belief space. Such
belief compression methods may prove important to design of future alerting systems
involving uncertain modes or many state variables.
4.5.2 Belief State Filtering
As described in chapter 2, the combination of probabilistic uncertain dynamics
and probabilistic observability leads to uncertainty in the current state in the form of a
probability distribution (belief state). The belief state takes into account all available
information, including prior knowledge, the transition and sensor models, observations
made and past inputs to the system. This combining of information is achieved at each
time step using a recursive algorithm:
bs(k) = c O(s(k)) 2 T(s(k-1), a(k-1)) bs(k.1) (4.9)
All s(k-1)
The formula states that the updated belief state, bs(k), is found by summing the
transition functions for all possible current s(k-1), weighting at each state by the current
state likelihood bs(k.1), and then multiplying the resulting function of s(k) times the
observation function, O(o(k) I s(k)). The constant a ensures that the resulting
distribution function sums to 1 over its domain. Since the values of a(k-1) and o(k) are
assumed known, and s(k-1) is eliminated by the summation, the final expression is a
function of s(k) only. Note that the previous belief state can be either the result of a
previous iteration of the formula or a prior belief state, bs(o), that initializes the process.
Thus, this formula does incorporate all of the information available in prior knowledge,
b,,o), the process model, T(-,-) and O(.), and the history of past actions and observations
(the evidence), { o(O), a(0), o(1), a(1), ..., o(k), a(k) }.
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The Markov assumption that was made in defining T(.,.) is important here
because it allows the recursive formula shown, as opposed to one that explicitly contains
the entire evidence history. Given that the amount of evidence increases with time, such
an expression would become increasingly unwieldy and impractical to use with time. For
a more detailed discussion of the belief filtering formula and the significance of the
Markov assumption, see appendix A.
4.6 Human Modeling Issues
As mentioned in section 4.2.2, the reward function R(-) over the state space S is
meant as an approximate representation of the goals or priorities of the alerting system.
Based on this, the MDP theory generates a policy that is optimal in the utility
maximization sense, and presumably rational. The human operators that receive alerts
might also be assumed rational, at least ideally, and to act to maximize their own utility
function. Such an operator would try to make best use of any signals generated by the
alerting system and to do so requires a notion of what the alerting signal means. This is
only to point out that whatever R(-) is used for the alerting system involves at least
implicit assumptions about operator behavior and preferences. If the reward function
conflicts in some way with an operator's understanding of the alerts, or sense of what is
justified, the result is improper alerts (section 2.2). This means that when using the MDP
design method, which maps alerting preferences directly into the logic, the potential for
improper alerts should be considered at the reward function definition stage.
A related issue is the fact that operators learn from observations of the alerting
system's behavior, which can cause their understanding of and reactions to alerts to
change over time. For this reason it may still be necessary to perform the sort of global
trajectory analysis that is commonly used in current methods. For example, Monte Carlo
analysis of the alerting logic can provide a more complete picture of the human responses
implied by the reward function and operator model that were used, including rates at
which evasion commands are modified or reversed, and the overall rates of alerts and
incidents. This will help in judging whether the situation model seems consistent with
realistic operator behavior. A high alert or incident rate in simulations where an operator
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is assumed to conform to alerts could indicate an inherently unacceptable situation where
no alerting system would help. In the end, the alerting system design process may take
an iterative form where reward and utility functions are arrived at through adjustment of
initial estimates.
4.7 Chapter Summary
The alerting problem is restated in terms of the basic elements of a Markov
decision process. This includes the state space { s, S }, the observation space { o, 0 },
the action space { a, A }, the transition function T(s, Ta), and the observation function
O(s) (for partially observable problems, such as with uncertain modes).
The method also requires defining alerting system performance requirements
(outcome preferences) in terms of a trajectory utility function U(Tr), which associates a
utility value with every possible trajectory t. The utility function is so defined that for
any two outcome trajectories, the relative utilities describe the degree of alerting system
preference between the two. The trajectory utility function corresponds to a reward
function R(s) that gives the reward (utility contribution) of the situation reaching a
particular state. The utility of a trajectory is the cumulative reward from the sequence of
states passed through.
Decisions are made by the maximum expected utility principle. Ideally, the
decision that would result in the maximum utility is preferred, but state uncertainty (due
to the stochastic transition and sensor functions) makes exact utility impossible to
compute. Expected utility is considered the next best decision metric.
Expected utility can be difficult or impossible to estimate quickly through forward
simulation of trajectories. Because alerting decisions must occur in real time, a more
efficient means of estimating expected utilities is needed. This is achieved through
policy generation, in which a function relating each state, or belief state, to an expected
utility and optimal action is pre-computed using Bellman's equation. The policy is stored
in a table or other form that allows real-time retrieval of function values.
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Alerting processes involving uncertain mode variables have more complicated
policy solutions, because the policy is then a function of a belief state rather than a
regular state (making it a POMDP problem). One common solution method involves
representing the belief state as a parameterized function, so that the range of possible
belief states coiTesponds to a range of parameter values. Then the problem can be
approached in the same way as a regular MDP.
The reward function of an alerting system represents the alerting system's
preferences, which in turn should be related to and in agreement with the preferences of
operators who receive alerts. Otherwise, the alerting system will produce improper alerts
that harm long-term performance.
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5. Applying the MDP Method to an Aircraft
Passing Scenario
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter the benefit of MDP methods is shown for a simplified aircraft
collision avoidance problem. Figure 5.1 shows the scenario of interest. Two aircraft
approach one another at similar altitudes so that there is some nominal probability of a
collision. A collision will be defined as the crossing of one aircraft through a protected
region about the other, as shown. One aircraft, called the evader, has the option of using
a climb evasion maneuver if needed to avoid a collision with the other aircraft, or
intruder. Each aircraft moves randomly in altitude over time, and this translates into a
randomly changing vertical separation between the two. This randomness makes
Avoidance maneuver
Evader
-Nominal direction Intruder
Collision region
Figure 5.1: Aircraft Encounter Scenario
exact forecasting of a collision impossible, so it is not clear if or when an evasion
maneuver is needed. This is a basic example compared to many realistic alerting
situations (e.g., where additional avoidance options or 3-dimensional position might be
involved), but the simplifications cause no loss of generality in the methods described,
and could be relaxed.
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Figure 5.2 shows a model of the 2-aircraft system. The aircraft are constrained to
a plane, with the evader fixed at the origin of the relative position axes, X and y. The
relative horizontal speed is assumed constant, while the relative vertical speed can vary in
x(k+1i) x(k)
Collision region
vclosing At
Gaussian uncertainty
X
Intruder
"-4
Markov Encounter Model - Nominal Dynamics
either direction over time. Prior to any alert, the relative motion is described by a process
of the form
x(k+1) = x(k) + vciosing At (5.1)
y(k+1) = y(k) + vw(k) At
with the following definitions
x(k+1)
y(k+1)
x(k)
y(k)
At
Vclosing
Horizontal relative position at the next time step
Vertical relative position at the next time step
Current horizontal relative position
Current vertical relative position
Constant time increment
Constant horizontal closing rate
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Evader
Figure 5.2:
--..- -.--
Gaussian white sequence climb rate disturbance input
The first equation describes the constant horizontal closing rate as a discrete-time
process. The second says that the future vertical position of the intruder is a discrete-time
Markov random process depending only on relative altitude. Vertical position is
predictable only within a normal distribution whose mean is the current position. The
variance of predicted vertical position increases linearly with the number of steps into the
future (Brown & Hwang).
While the previous equations describe the nominal dynamics that apply before
any evasion maneuver occurs, the following one describes the vertical position during a
climb escape maneuver (figure 5.3):
y(k+1) = y(k) + ( vw(k) + vcllmb ) At (5.2)
The difference is the addition of a constant bias, vciimb, the average
horizontal motion is identical for the nominal and evasion cases.
y
Evader
Gaussian nominal uncertainty
Gaussian climb uncertainty
climb rate. The
x(k)
x
Vcimb At
Figure 5.3: Markov Encounter Model - Climb Dynamics
A climb by the evader causes a relative descent by the intruder, as figure 5.3 shows.
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vw(k)
Since the evader is fixed at the origin, a collision happens if the intruder crosses
through a region about the origin. Because vertical motion is slow relative to horizontal,
the collision region is simplified for convenience from an area around the evader to
passing within 100 vertical feet at the y-axis, as shown in the figures with a hatched bar.
To simplify the discussion, this model has only two physical state variables: the
relative vertical and horizontal positions. A more realistic description of aircraft
dynamics could use additional state variables, such as the absolute speeds and positions
of each aircraft, but the same design principles would apply. The next chapter will
consider one possible improvement, namely the inclusion of a dynamic mode variable to
.distinguish between normal and failure situations.
Parameters were chosen to simulate an aircraft encounter with a horizontal
closing speed of vctosng = 440 knots (743 ft/sec). An input noise standard deviation of vw,
= 1,858 ft/min (31 ft/sec) was assumed with a 0.32 sec time increment At. This is
equivalent to a vertical drift standard deviation of 100 ft after a 24,000 ft (approximately
4 nautical mile) horizontal interval. The simplified model produces random trajectories
that tend to remain near the initial relative altitude, with possible moderate climbing or
descending. A mean evasion climb rate Vclimb of 1,500 ft/min (25 ft/sec) is assumed.
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Figure 5.4 shows an example trajectory resulting from these dynamic assumptions
over a 32 second interval. For the first (right) half the nominal dynamics are used, and
for the second half the climb dynamics are used. The collision region is also included as
a shaded bar about the evader.
Motion
Nominal dynamicsEvader
Climb dynamics
Intruder
0
Figure 5.4:
5 10 15 20
xthousand ft
Example Trajectory: Nominal and Climb Dynamics
5.2 Basic Reward Function for Alerting
The MDP framework requires that all of the goals or preferences of the alerting
system be represented in terms of the relative utilities of events that can happen. Then
the decision process becomes a matter of acting to maximize expected utility at each step.
In SOC (system operating characteristic) analysis the quality of alerting decisions
is measured in terms of whether alerts happen, whether they are needed, and whether the
resulting trajectories are safe. There are desirable and undesirable final outcomes, and as
discussed in section 2.2, it is typically impossible to guarantee that only desirable ones
happen. A trade-off must be made between them. SOC plots are one tool for analyzing
the trade-off, stating it in terms of the probabilities or rates of positive and negative
outcomes.
Making a trade-off between different outcomes requires knowing the relative
desirability of the outcomes. In a utility approach such preferences are expressed by
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assigning numeric values to the outcomes. Outcomes with larger numbers have greater
desirability, and the larger the difference between two possibilities, the greater the
preference of one over the other. In figure 5.5 possible alerting outcomes are divided into
a set of mutually exclusive events. These are all of the possible combinations of the three
above-mentioned categories from SOC theory, six in all (the two shaded event blocks are
excluded because they are impossible.) Recall that an alert is considered successful if no
incident happens, and necessary if an incident would have happened without the alert.
Alert Happened No Alert Happened
Successful Unsuccessful Successful Unsuccessful
Necessary
Unnecessary
Necessary
Unnecessary
Figure 5.5: Utilities of Alerting Outcomes
In a Markov decision process approach to the alerting problem this information
about outcome preferences must be expressed as a trajectory utility function, which will
be assumed to take the form
n
Ur =Y, R, (5.3)
t = k
where the total utility for the future trajectory is a sum of the rewards gained at each state.
This is the additive rewards utility function (eq. 4.4) described in section 4.2, where the
discounting factor is set to 1. This is reasonable here assuming rewards are well bounded
and that the alerting process ends at some point in time so that the trajectory utility is
finite. A convenient end point for the aircraft passing situation is when the intruder
passes the y axis: after this point the intruder no longer poses a danger, so the alerting
system can stop monitoring it.
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Correct Late
Detection Alert
UCD ULA
Unnecessary Induced
Alert Incident
UUA U11
Missed
Detection
UMD
Correct
Rejection
UCR
A utility ranking of the outcomes could be defined as follows
Uincident ULA = U11 = UMD (54)
USA UCD = UUA
Uincident < USA < UCR
This says that all collision outcomes have equal utility, all successful alert outcomes have
equal utility, and correct rejections are preferred over all other outcomes. In some ways
this ranking may seem oversimplified; a correct detection seems intuitively better than an
unnecessary alert, and an induced collision might be considered-worse than a missed
detection or late alert. On the other hand, once an alert occurs it is impossible to know
whether it was necessary or not in order to make such utility distinctions, because the
alert precludes observing the nominal trajectory. So whether there is any practical
difference between the different kinds of incident is debatable. Examples in this thesis
will assume the (5.4) outcome utility scheme, but it should be noted that the generality of
utility does allow for other schemes if needed.
In its favor, this utility scheme conforms to with existing SOC philosophy in that
there are two main error types-incidents (unsuccessful alerts) and unnecessary alerts-
that should both be avoided if possible to maximize utility. Otherwise some optimal
trade-off between the two is needed. This agreement with SOC philosophy allows a
direct performance comparison between MDP-based and SOC-based logics in the next
chapter.
Specific utility values for the three outcome categories are chosen to best reflect
the degree of preference between them. For example, the utility of a successful alert is
probably much nearer to that of a correct rejection outcome than a collision. Assuming
Uincident is fixed, the nearer USA becomes to UCR, the less the alerting system would
expect to gain from deferring alerts, and the earlier alerts would tend to occur. This is
true regardless of the utility of a collision, as long as it is less than the other two. Thus,
relative utility can be of more significance than absolute utility when assigning utilities.
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Recalling that the trajectory utility is a sum of the rewards for each state passed
through, one possible reward function is shown in figure 5.6. If the intruder arrives at a
point within the collision zone about the evader, then an incident happens and the
incident utility, Uincident, applies. Setting the end-state reward value equal to the total
trajectory utility constrains the previous terms of the reward function in that their values
must sum to zero. For collision cases, the most obvious solution is to let all previous
state rewards be zero. However, there still two kinds of non-collision outcome to
consider.
y
USA or UCR
VX Evader
Uincident X
USA or UCR
Figure 5.6: End-State Reward Definitions
While there is no ambiguity about the appropriate collision outcome utility-it
applies regardless of the previous trajectory taken-the non-collision utility depends on
whether or not an alert occurred before the end. An alert happens the first time the climb
action is selected. If there was no alert and the trajectory ended in the safe range then
UCR is the appropriate outcome utility. If an alert did occur, then the USA utility applies
instead. This conditionality on the alert status suggests that lumping the trajectory utility
into a single end-state reward as in collision would require a third state variable in
addition to x and y. This will be designated AS (alert status), and is a discrete two-state
variable indicating a state either Before or After an alert.
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Figure 5.7 illustrates the 3-variable state space and end rewards. It can be thought
of as two position planes, one for each alert status, with different end-position rewards.
y
AS (alert status)
X
Figure 5.7: State Space with Alert Status Variable
The system trajectory originates in the front plane at the right edge, and moves leftward
according to the nominal dynamics as long as no alert occurs. If no alert ever occurs, the
trajectory will encounter either the incident or the correct rejection end-state utility. If an
alert does occur, the state transitions from the Before to the After alert status plane, and
remains there for the remainder of the scenario. In that case, non-collision end positions
have the successful alert rather than the correct rejection reward. For any trajectory, this
arrangement assigns the correct outcome utility as defined by the (5.4) expressions.
Thus, no additional rewards or penalties are needed from trajectory states before the end
state, and this results in a reward function of the form
Ut = R(xt, yf, ASf) (5.5)
5.3 Alerting Policy and Threshold
As mentioned in chapter 4, the most desirable solution to the alerting problem is a
policy function that determines the next action from the current state with a minimum of
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computation. This section describes the policy generation process for the example
alerting problem, based on the reward function defined in the previous section.
This problem is convenient in having a well-defined process end condition-
reaching the yposition axis. It also has dynamics that guarantee an orderly traversal of
the state space, with no chance of occupying a single state twice (the horizontal position
always moves forward, and in the same direction.) This allows generating a policy in a
direct and fast way that avoids the iterative methods often necessary with MDP problems.
An inconvenience of this system is that it has a variable with a continuous domain (y)
whereas the MDP method assumes discrete states. This is dealt with by using a discrete
approximation of y.
The approach is to generate a function that gives an expected utility for each
possible action at each state. Then, by the maximum expected utility principle, the
preferred action is the one with the highest expected utility. In this case the utility
function has a 4-variable domain, including three state variables in figure 5.7 and the
action.
First note that for any end state, the expected utility is the exact utility given by
the reward function defined previously (5.5). Next, note that the state one step prior to
that one is in the set of states where xp = Xf - Ax, where xf is the location of the end state
and Ax is the increment between horizontal positions. Knowing the probabilistic system
dynamics T and the end-state expected utilities U(xf, yf, ASr), the expected utility of the
prior state, s,= { xp, yp, AS, }, for a particular action a is given by
Ua(xp, yp, ASp) = E( U(x, yf, AS) I xp, yp, ASp, a) (5.6)
= I U(xf, yf, ASf) T(xt, yf, ASf / xp, yp, ASp, a)
All sr
= X U(sf) T(sf /sp, a)
All s,
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Figure 5.8 illustrates the variables and functions involved. From the definition of
the expected value, Ua(xp, yp, ASp) is the summation of the end-state utility function
y
U(xf, yf, AS)
T (yf |xp, yp, ASp, a)
ASP,
Axx
pX
Xf Xp
Figure 5.8: Utility and Probability Distribution of Last Step
U(xf, yf, ASf), weighted by the final-state distribution (transition function)
T(x, yf, ASf / Xp, yp, ASp, a), over all possible end states, Sf. In the figure, the black line
at each xf state represents the probability of transitioning to that state, and the hatched
bars represent the expected utility of the state. The two quantities are multiplied at each
state and then summed to give the expected utility at sp. In this case xf and ASf are
determined exactly by the previous state and a, so the transition function is really a
distribution over yf. The above formula (5.6) gives the utility for a single action, so the
calculation must be repeated for each action. The overall utility of the prior state is
defined as the maximum value for the possible actions
U(xp, yp, ASp) = max[ U8(xp, yp, ASp)] (5.7)
a
and the maximizing action is the policy output for that state. Notice that what is referred
to as the "utility" of a state is really the maximum expected utility for that state, but the
simpler term is sometimes used for convenience.
77
Using the above formulas (5.7), the utility can be determined for every state in the
xp subset. The resulting utility function then becomes the basis for finding utilities for
the next layer back, x = xp - Ax, by a similar procedure as with (5.6 and 6.7). This is
repeated for every step backward until a complete utility function and action policy is
obtained for the entire state space.
Figure 5.9 shows the pre-alert utility function for each action, resulting from
applying the described method to the example system with the defined reward function
(5.5) and outcome utilities of UCR = 1.1, USA = 1 and Uincident = 0. Each plot is of the
utility of taking the indicated action at all positions in the plane. The utility functions are
-500 I I L
0 5 10 15 20
x thousand ft
500 Climb action
..........
X thousand ft
Figure 5.9: Constant-Utility Contours Before Alert
represented by constant-utility contours. In each plot, the utility function minimum is
Uincident and occurs at the x-Y origin, and increases outward from there. In the deferral or
nominal action case (top) the maximum utility is UCR and occurs in the broad, level area
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outside the outermost contour. In the other case the maximum is USA and is also in the
outermost area.
Figure 5.10 shows the complete utility function, covering both before and after-
alert states. The before-alert plots to the left are the ones from figure 5.9. After the alert,
the nominal and climb actions are still both available, but unlike before the alert there is
no possibility of gaining a UCR reward at the end. Maximizing utility now means
maximizing safety, since safe alert outcomes are still worth more than collisions. The
after-alert utility functions for the nominal and climb actions are very similar. The reason
is that regardless of which action is taken at a given state, both actions are known to be
available at the next step, and since the position increment is small, not much safety is
lost due to lost time in a single step.
Before Alert After Alert
1000 1000-
500- 500-
0 0
-50014 -500
-1000 - '_' ' -1000
0 5 10 15 20 0 5 10 15 20
x thousand ft x thousand ft
1000 -1000
500 . 500-
0 0
-500. -500-
-1000 ' ' ' '-10001
0 5 10 15 20 0 5 10 15 20
x thousand ft X thousand ft
Figure 5.10: Constant-Utility Contours Before and After Alert
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The utility functions for the climb action before and after the alert are identical,
because the distribution of the next state is the same for both.
If the state begins at s = { x = 24,000 ft, y = 0 ft, AS = Before } and moves
leftward on a collision course, and assuming alerts are suppressed (so no AS transition
occurs), a distinct utility trace results for each possible action. These are as shown
superimposed in the figure 5.11 plot of utility vs. horizontal distance. Far from the
collision there is a slight utility benefit for the nominal action over the climb, hardly
visible on the plot. This relative benefit becomes progressively smaller with distance
until the nominal and climb actions have the same utility where arrow indicates, at 11,000
ft separation. Beyond this point the nominal action has a lower utility, and both utilities
keep decreasing as long as the collision path is followed, due to the decreasing
probability of avoiding the collision.
Defer (nominal)
1
0.8-
0.6 Evasion (climb)
0.4Crossover Point
0.24-
0
0 5 10 15 20
x thousand ft
Figure 5.11: Utility vs. Distance for Head-On Collision Trajectory
Following the maximum expected utility principle, an evasion maneuver would
have occurred at the crossover point. The location of the crossover depends on the
relative values of the basic outcome utilities: UCR, USA and Uincident. If UCR becomes
greater relative to USA while holding USA - Uincident constant, then the crossover point will
be delayed longer, because it is more worth risking a collision to avoid alerting.
The reason the expected utility benefit of the deferral action is so small initially is
that with the defined system dynamics and initial position, the probability of avoiding a
collision through normal random drift is small. If the initial vertical position were further
80
from zero, or the variance of the random process were increased, the utility of the
nominal action would be nearer to its maximum of 1.1.
Since the alert threshold is where the two before-alert action options have equal
utility, the position-plane threshold is the zero-value contour of their difference, defined
by
Unominal(X, y, Before) - Uclimb(x, y, Before) = 0. (5.8)
The.two functions Unominal and Uoimb are the ones from figure 5.9. Figure 5.12
shows the threshold contour, along with the collision trajectory that produced figure 5.11.
This is the threshold policy.
400 E(U, defer) - E(UI alert) =0
Higher utility by alerting
200 in this region
-200 Higher utility by deferring alert
in this region
-400
0 5 10 15 -20
x thousand ft
Figure 5.12: Alerting Threshold (Equal-Action-Utility Contour)
The intruder begins at the right edge of the plane and moves at constant speed.
According to the assumed dynamics, the vertical position should change randomly, but an
idealized trajectory is used to more clearly show the utility trend in figure 5.11. As long
as the intruder is outside the threshold contour, the deferral action is preferred. At the
threshold, the climb action should be chosen, causing the alert status AS to switch to the
After value.
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5.4 After-Alert Guidance
During the deferral phase of an encounter, the assumption is that humans in the
situation are in control and the alerting system is only passively monitoring. The first use
of the climb action marks the initial alert displayed to the operators. At this point the
situation enters the AS= After state as mentioned. In this state the alerting system still
considers both the nominal and climb options, by assumption, but they have different
meaning in that the alerting system is now actively guiding the situation. The nominal
action is then not a deferral of action, but a command to take a non-climb action. But
there is no general requirement that post-alert guidance commands correspond one-to-one
to pre-alert options as in this example.
In the same way as the Before alert mode, guidance (After) mode action switching
occurs along a zero-utility-difference contour in the position plane. Now this contour is
formed using the two right-side utility functions from figure 5.10. The contour is shown
in figure 5.13, along with the original alerting threshold, which no longer applies. Also
drawn is the idealized head-on collision scenario, but where alerts are no longer
suppressed.
400 Post-alert switching threshold
Alert threshold
200
4t Z Ideal trajectory
-200
-400 Switch back to nominal
0 5 10 15 20
x thousand ft
Figure 5.13: Guidance Switching Threshold
When the trajectory reaches the alerting threshold at x = 11,000 ft, a climb action
is chosen, the alert status switches to After, and the threshold contour is replaced with the
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guidance switching contour. Just after the alert, the position is in a region where the
climb action has the highest utility, and a continuous climb occurs until the new contour
is reached. At the lower contour edge and beyond, the climb and nominal utilities are
equal, at least within the precision of the computed utility functions. The nominal action
was chosen as the default for such a condition, so the final trajectory segment past
x = 2500 ft is a sequence of nominal actions. In contrast, at the upper contour edge (the
straight line extending from the origin) the switch is critical, because above this the
nominal action becomes relatively safe (the utility is higher) compared to the climb.
Figure 5.14 shows an example of command switching at the upper contour. In
this case a crossing of the alert threshold occurs, but rather than climbing as directed the
vehicle continues on a level path. The suggested action continues to be a climb until the
contour crossing at the 9,000 ft point. Figure 5.15 shows the action utility traces
.Post-alert switching threshold400
200
- - - Alert threshold
-200 ~
-400
0 5 10 15 20
x thousand ft
Figure 5.14: Alert Guidance Reversal Case
corresponding to the trajectories in figure 5.13 and 5.14. The vertical dotted lines mark
the action switch points. In the normal evasion example, the utility at the alert point is
nearly 1 (figure 5.15a), which reflects that there is little chance of a collision (in which
case Ut = Uincident = 0) to reduce expected utility below the USA level (U, = USA = 1).
All through the evasion maneuver, expected safety and utility of both actions remains
near 1. For the figure 5.14 trajectory, where the climb fails to occur when it should, the
initial utility of the nominal action (5.15b) is larger than in (5.15a) due to the 150 ft
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vertical offset of the initial position. Nearer to the evader the deferral utility drops due to
the decreasing safety of the climb evasion option. After the alert, the utility of both
actions declines until the 9000 ft point, where the nominal action is once again safer and
a command switch occurs. After this, the nominal action continues to be the safer of the
two until the end.
(a) Normal evasion (fig. 5.13)
Switch :Alert
1
0.9
0.8
0
Climb Defer (Nominal)
5 10 15 20
x thousand ft
(b) Evasion suppressed (fig. 5.14)
Switch
Nominal 09Clim
0. 9 ,.
0.8
0
: Alert
Defer (Nominal)
5 10 15 20
x thousand ft
Figure 5.15: Utilities for Guidance Switching Trajectories
Discussing this example has involved statements conflating equating with utility
during the after-alert phase. While valid here, it is a special case. In general, safety and
utility have a more complicated relationship. For example, in Before alert states, a
nominal action utility of I could result from averaging more than one combination of
prior incident (UT = 0) and correct rejection (U, = 1.1) and successful alert (U, = 1)
probabilities. After the alert the only two utility outcomes are 0 and 1, so collision
probability and utility are equivalent.
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5.5 Cumulative Rewards: Excessive Guidance Switching
The reward function defined in section 5.2 works as hoped for the idealized
trajectories considered up to now, using only an end-state reward. A more thorough
analysis with realistic sample trajectories reveals a problem that figure 5.16 illustrates.
The original policy results in a guidance switching contour that is fixed for the duration
of the encounter. This means that under some conditions, it may be possible for to the
state to cross the threshold in one direction and quickly return, causing rapid switching.
This is the case in figure 5.16, where randomness in the vertical position path causes the
position to waver at the threshold, resulting in 5 switches over several seconds.
Post-alert switching threshold400
Alert threshold
200
-200
0 5 10 15 20
x thousand ft
Figure 5.16: Excessive Guidance Switching
Human operators can be expected to follow guidance, but only within limits. Due
to unavoidable response delays, rapid command switching may be impossible to follow
accurately. In addition such commands can seem irrational or confusing, and cause an
unpredictable response.
One way to deal with this is to build operator limitations like response time into
the transition function, adding state variables if needed. An example is adding a timer
state variable for keeping track of response delays. Another way is to define the reward
function with operator preferences in mind, so that alerting system preferences are in
agreement with operator preferences. For example, the operator's reluctance to switch
85
actions during an evasion maneuver can be modeled as a penalty (negative reward) for
any step where a switch happens. In this example a combination of both was used to
against the excessive switching problem.
The main idea was to apply a penalty for any change of action happening after the
initial alert. At each decision point this requires comparing the action options to the
previous action. To recall the previous action, a new variable,
aprev E { Nominal, Climb }, must be added to the state. The compete state is then s = { x,
y, AS, aprev }. Because the policy must assign an action for every possible combination
of values of the state variables, this is potentially a function over N, x Ny x NAS x Naprev
states, where each factor is the number of values of the corresponding variable. In this
case the set of states can be reduced by noting that any combination where AS = Before
and aprev = Climb at the same time is impossible. This reduces the domain size by one
fourth.
The new reward function for the current state and candidate action option is
Rs(s, a) + Rf(sf) if s = Sf (5.9)
R(s, a) =
R,(s, a) otherwise
where Rj(Sf) is the original end-state reward function (5.5), which is independent of a and
aprev, and Rs(s, a) is an additional switching "reward" term defined as
-p if a # aprev and AS = After
R8(s, a) =
0 otherwise
where p is the magnitude of the penalty for an action change. The action utility functions
are generated in a similar manner as before, solving backward from the end states, except
at each state a penalty is subtracted from the expected next-state utility if aprev differs
from the assumed next action.
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The resulting alerting policy is shown in figure 5.17, for an assumed penalty of
0.01 per switch, and otherwise the same parameter values as before. The alert threshold
is not visibly changed by the new penalty. There is significant change, however, to the
after-alert switching thresholds. Whereas the old policy allowed back-and-forth
switching of guidance actions along a single contour, the new policy has two contours,
one for each action, that are physically separated except along a shared boundary at the
top of the alert contour. The separation of the two contours makes rapid back-and-forth
switching less likely to happen in the course of evasions similar to the one drawn. In
particular, the example scenario in figure 5.16 would most likely have ended with a
continuous climb evasion if this policy were used.
800
Post-alert climb-to-nominal switching threshold
600 Post-alert nominal-to-climb switching threshold
Alert threshold -
400 ---
200 f;
- -- Ideal !trajedctory
-200-
0 5 10 15 20
x thousand ft
Figure 5.17: Action Switching Contours with Switching Penalty
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5.6 SOC Performance Analysis
The mentioned shared switching boundary is reachable by trajectories such as
trajectory (a) in figure 5.18. This feature remains despite the penalty on switching
because, near the collision zone, the penalty is overwhelmed by a safety-related rapid loss
of expected utility as the incident approaches. In addition to this problem, another issue
is the possibility of a trajectory like (b), which follows the upper edge of the alert
threshold, and ends in a collision without ever triggering an alert. Preventing scenarios
like these could require further changes to the reward function or system dynamics, or
adding more control options such as a descend action.
800
Post-alert climb-to-nominal switching threshold
600 Post-ale t no ninal-to-climbiswitching threshold
400 -
(b)
200
-200
0 5 10 15 20
x thousand ft
Figure 5.18: Problem Trajectories
Whether changes are needed also depends on the likelihood of the failure. If the
prior probability of a failure scenario is low enough, the policy may be considered
acceptable as it is. To aid making design choices like this one, or to assess the overall
benefit of an alerting system, global performance metrics such as prior incident
probability (as mentioned) and unnecessary alert rates remain useful alongside utility
decision metrics.
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The SOC plot in figure 5.19, for example, helps understand the performance of
the example policy, and the effect of adding a switching penalty. Random trajectories
were generated beginning at a y position uniformly distributed between -1000 and
1000 ft, and with the alerting logic generating alerts and guidance. This was continued
until 10,000 alerts occurred (many trajectories did not result in alerts). Two versions of
the logic were simulated in this way: the original logic and the one with penalties on
switching. Only trajectories in which an alert (or missed detection, which is treated as an
alert) occurred were used in generating the SOC plot, which describes the conditional
probabilities of successful and unnecessary alerts, given that an alert happened. As
shown, the resulting safety is 0.991 for both, accurate within about 0.002 with 95%
certainty. Their difference is within 0.0026 with 95% certainty. The unnecessary alert
rates are 0.41 for the original and 0.40 for the version with penalties (within about 0.01
with 95% uncertainty) and their difference is 0.01 within 0.014. While the original logic
produces an average of 1.4 action switches after the initial alert, the version with a
switching penalty produces 0.04, or an approximate reduction by a factor of 35. This is
unsurprising, as the original logic guarantees at least one switch during any successful
alert scenario, as figure 5.13 makes clear, and any penalty would likely prevent that
switch.
1
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Figure 5.19: Global Performance: With and Without Switching Penalty
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5.7 Chapter Summary
This chapter used a simple aircraft collision avoidance process to illustrate the use
of Markov decision process modeling to generate an alerting logic from requirements.
This involved
* Identifying the Markov state of the process.
" Describing alerting system outcome preferences in the form of a reward function,
including defining new state variables if necessary.
* Generating an efficient policy based on the state and reward function.
Also included was a discussion of the need to tailor the alerting threshold and
guidance to operator preferences and ability, and demonstration of one method of
reducing undesirable guidance switching through state and reward function
modifications. Finally; the importance of using global performance analysis (such as
Monte Carlo trajectory simulation) along with reward function design was discussed.
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6. Aircraft Encounter with Uncertain Modes
6.1 Introduction
The 2-aircraft system from chapter 5 was convenient in that all of the necessary
state variables, including position, alert status, and knowledge of the previous alerting
system actions, were exactly known at all times. This made the alerting problem
amenable to basic MDP methods, including a straightforward policy solution. Many
systems of interest lack this property, making it necessary to estimate variables that are
unmeasurable or poorly measurable. A special case of this is where a system can operate
in multiple modes, changing mode randomly and infrequently. A particular Markov state
and transition model might describe its behavior well most of the time, but badly on rare
occasions, such as when a failure occurs in the system. A discrete, but unmeasurable
mode variable might then be defined as an index between the regular dynamics and an
alternate model that better describes the other types of behavior.
In much of airspace, normal operations keep aircraft well separated through
standard procedures or air traffic control oversight. Collisions, when they occur, tend to
happen after a breakdown of these mechanisms. This is an instance where an
unobservable mode variable could improve a Markov model over what is possible with a
fully observable encounter model like the one from chapter 5.
6.2 Modified Aircraft Encounter System
Figure 6.1 sketches a multiple mode encounter similar to one considered by
Kuchar (Kuchar, 1995). The evader nominally flies level and at a constant speed. The
intruder aircraft descends from above and is supposed to level off at an altitude a safe
distance D above the evader, as the relative trajectory shows. There is a chance,
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however, that it will instead continue descending at the initial rate, passing near or
colliding with the evader. The probabilities of these two events are 0.75 and 0.25
respectively.
Intruder
Vciosing
Level-off trajectory Vdescent
Nominal level-off altitude
Descent trajectory
Evader
Figure 6.1: Aircraft Encounter with Level-off Mode
As with the chapter 5 system the horizontal speeds of the aircraft are assumed
constant and equal, with a total closing rate veosing of 440 knots. Horizontal position and
time are discrete with increments of Ax and At. The Ax increment is 400 ft, for a At of
0.54 sec. The initial descent rate vdescent of the intruder is 2500 ft/min and the level-off
separation D is 1000 ft. Prior to any alert and before leveling off, the nominal descent is
described by the function
y(k+1) = y(k) - vdescent At
For the level-off mode and before any alert, the deceleration and level flying phase is
described by the function
y(k+1) = D + AYievei(k) e -
where AYIeve/(k) is
AYlevel(k) = y(k) - D
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(6.1)
(6.2)
(6.3)
which is the deviation of the intruder from the level-off separation. The coefficient P is
0.0003 1/ft, which results in a maximum vertical deceleration of 0.29g from the initial
2500 ft/min descent rate or an average of about 0.08g over 17 s until a 1 ft/sec vertical
rate is reached, assuming there is a smooth transition from the descend to the level-off
function. For the descend mode, the intruder instead maintains the vertical speed Vdescent
all the way to (nominally) a direct collision with the evader, so function (6.1) applies
through the entire encounter.
After an alert the evader receives a climb command, and is assumed to accelerate
instantaneously to vciimb, a 1500 ft/min climb rate. This is to approximate a constant
0.25g pull-up, which is a relatively aggressive maneuver spanning a shorter time
compared to the level-off maneuver of the intruder.
Prior to any alert, the evader is assumed to fly level at an altitude a distance D
from the intruder's level-off altitude. Once the evader begins a climb, its relative position
is no longer a valid reference point for predicting the level-off trajectory of the intruder.
To resolve this issue it will be assumed in advance that alerts will not happen before the
separation D has been reached. Under this assumption the intruder will either have
leveled off already, or be in descend mode where no reference altitude is required, when
an alert happens. The system dynamics following an alert are then approximately
y(k+1) = y(k) - vcIimb At (6.4)
if the intruder is in level-off mode, and
y(k+1) = y(k) - (Vdescent + VcIimb) At (6.5)
if the intruder is in descend mode. If an alert does occur before D is crossed, it will be
assumed that the intruder has nearly finished leveling off if in level-off mode, and
equation (6.4) will be applied. It should be kept in mind that errors may be large in this
range.
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Equations (6.1) through (6.5) describe the nominal dynamics of the system.
Small disturbances in the vertical separation due to sensor error and other factors (wind,
piloting error etc.) are modeled using a Gaussian white sequence input, vw, as in chapter 5
y(k+1) = y(k) - (vdescent + vw) At (6.6)
y(k+1) = D + Ayievei(k) e flAX + vw At (6.7)
y(k+1) = y(k) - (vciimb + vw) At (6.8)
y(k+1) = y(k) - (vdescent + Vclimb + vw) At (6.9)
This input describes the total deviation from the nominal path due to all noise and
disturbances. Since y is relative position, vw includes the uncertainties for both aircraft.
With the level-off dynamics (6.7), the disturbance will cause y to drift randomly, but the
exponential term will tend to counteract this and keep it near the level-off altitude in the
long run. When any of the other (constant vertical rate) functions are in effect, vw will
induce random walk behavior, where the variance of vertical position uncertainty grows
linearly with distance into the future (Brown & Hwang). A vw value of 1560 ft/min (26
ft/s) is assumed for all dynamic equations. This leads to a 30 ft steady-state standard
deviation for vertical position in the level-off mode, and in descend mode or during a
climb a 108 ft standard deviation after 24,000 horizontal feet.
Figure 6.2 shows the nominal level-off and descend-mode (or "blunder")
trajectories for the figure 6.1 scenario, along with randomly generated sample trajectories
for the specified parameter values and without alerts. Again, the evader is fixed at the
origin so the relative position of the intruder is what varies with time. Vertical separation
is defined as the intruder altitude minus the evader altitude, so that the scenario begins
with a positive vertical separation. Horizontal separation is defined similarly.
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Figure 6.2: Typical Relative Trajectories
6.3 Policy with Belief State
Unlike the variables x, y, AS, and aprev from the previous chapter, the encounter
mode, which will be referred to as m, cannot be exactly determined at each time step.
Knowledge of m is available in the form of a distribution over its two values. The
combination of m and its distribution is a belief state, as defined in section 2.3.1. The
domain of the belief state is the set of all possible distributions, of which there are an
infinite number in this case. Using a discrete approximation, figure 6.3 illustrates the
domain of the m belief state as an orderly progression through the distribution space.
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Figure 6.3: Discrete Mode Belief State Domain
In the diagram, mo is the level-off mode and m, is the descend mode.
Represented this way, there is little practical difference between the belief state of m and
regular states. Both kinds represent the current, complete knowledge or beliefs about
variables in the Markov state, so both are needed to make the most accurate prediction of
the future state and events. Both kinds of state are observable in a sense, either by direct
measurement or, for the belief state, by Bayes updating based on the previous belief state
and input to the system.
The usual approach to MDP problems involving belief states (POMDPs) is to
enumerate the belief state domain, if necessary using approximations such as the discrete
set in figure 6.3 in place of the full domain, and to include an index for the belief state as
a dimension of the state space (Russel & Norvig). Adding the belief state index to the
variables previously defined results in the total state
s = { x, y, AS, aprev, BS } (6.10)
where BS is the belief state index
BSe(= { bi,b2, b3, b4 , b5} (6.11)
The state s has a domain at most the size of the product of the sizes of all
component variables
Ns = Nx x Ny x NAS x Naprevx NBS (6.12)
which increases linearly with the number of possible belief states, NBS.
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For ease of finding a policy, the fewer states there are, the better. As in the last
example, some states in the above space are clearly not reachable by definition of the
corresponding Markov dynamics and possible initial states: any state where AS = Before
and aprev # ao (defer) can be eliminated by replacing the two variables with a single
combination state variable, CS, whose domain is only the possible combinations of those
variables.
S = { x, y, CS, BS } (6.13)
Other than the addition of the belief state index, BS, this is similar to the state of the
previous example system. The constrained way the state space is traversed, with each x
value occurring only once and in fixed order, is also similar. An identical reward
function can be used, and for simplicity an action switching cost of zero (see eq. 5.9) will
be assumed. The policy can be computed using the same procedure as before, starting at
the end-state layer and working backward through state space to generate utility functions
for the nominal and climb actions.
Figure 6.4 shows the alerting threshold in the x-y plane. Because there is an
additional dimension in the state space, several threshold contours are drawn,
representing the different discrete belief states. In other words, a contour crossing will
only result in an alert if the belief state at that time is in the belief state range for the
contour. In actual use the alerting system will not be forced to choose one of the five
discrete belief states in order to use the policy. Instead, a belief state can be maintained
in the full, continuous domain and used with interpolation to estimate the action utilities
from the discrete policy. The same method is also employed with the vertical position y,
since the system dynamics are not discrete in that dimension.
To show the boundaries more clearly, figure 6.5 draws the alert space for each
belief state separately.
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Figure 6.4: Threshold Contours for a Range of Belief States
With the chosen parameters, an alert could apparently occur even before the level-
off separation is passed if the descend mode is completely certain (mode belief state
bm = [0 1 ]). On the other extreme, where there is zero probability of the descend mode
(bm = [ 1 0 ]) the intruder would actually have to be at the same altitude or below the
evader for an alert to be desirable. In the co-altitude configuration the evader has a clear
climb path and can easily escape at the last moment with little chance of an induced
collision, regardless of the mode. When the intruder approaches from above in descend
mode, the possibility of an induced collision reduces the utility of the climb action
relative to deferring. In between the two belief state extremes (e.g. bm = [ 0.5 0.5 ]) there
is greater uncertainty about the path of the intruder, so the alerting system tends to be
defer alerts longer, knowing that an unnecessary alert and command reversal or an
induced collision would likely result.
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Figure 6.5: Threshold Contours Separated
Because the alerting threshold depends on the current mode belief state,
continuous belief updating is necessary as described in chapter 4 and appendix A. This
means using measurements of observable state variables (position), the most recent belief
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state, and the assumed dynamics for each mode to determine the most reasonable current
mode distribution.
6.4 Level-off Scenario
Figure 6.6 shows an idealized (with no disturbance input) level-off scenario,
where the intruder begins at a 2500 ft/min descent speed and decelerates smoothly to stop
P(descend) = 1
Begin
P(descend) = 0.25
P(descend) = 0
Nominal utility
Alert utility
P(descend) << 1
P(descend)
5 10
x thousand ft
15 20
Figure 6.6: Level-Off Scenario
at a target altitude 1000 ft above the evader. In the process the outer alerting contour is
crossed, but no alert occurs. The reason for this is made clear in the plot underneath,
which shows a trace of the different action utilities and the mode belief state (the
descend-mode probability) over the course of the scenario. Initially there is a 0.25
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probability that the intruder will fail to level off, posing a significant danger to the
evader. As the intruder decelerates, which is more likely in the level-off mode than in the
descend mode, the probability that the intruder is in the descend mode decreases to 0.03
by the 17,500 ft horizontal separation point. For this belief state to trigger an alert, the
intruder would have to be at or below the altitude of the evader, since the entire alert
space range for the belief state range [ 0.75 0.25 ] to [ 1 0 ] is below this altitude. The
contour crossed, corresponding to a descend-mode probability of 1, is not within this
range, so no alert occurs.
The alerting threshold was defined as where the alert (climb) action utility is
equal to the deferral (nominal) action utility. Outside of the threshold the deferral has a
higher utility. In the figure 6.6 utility trace the deferral utility is higher than the alert
utility at all times, so no alert is ever needed. As the descend-mode probability
approaches zero, the deferral action utility increases toward its maximum possible value
of 1.1, because in the level-off mode there is virtually no chance of a lower-utility
trajectory (a collision or alert).
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6.5 Descend Scenario
Figure 6.7 shows an idealized descend-mode scenario with the same initial
conditions as the level-off scenario. Without any alert, the trajectory will end with a
collision. Following the alerting policy, an alert occurs at about 760 ft vertical
separation. The resulting climb action is continued until the end of the scenario.
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Figure 6.7: Descend-Mode Scenario
The initial descend-mode probability is again 0.25, but in this case the probability
increases as evidence is gathered, and by the 15,000 ft horizontal position it has already
reached 1 in the plot (visually, though in reality it never quite reaches 1). The [ 0 1]
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contour is encountered about 2,000 ft later. Since the belief state is just under 1 when the
[0 1 ] contour is crossed, the alert is triggered just inside that contour.
Before the alert there is still some chance of a safe, non-alert outcome for which
the utility would be high (UCR = 1.1), and this keeps the deferral-action expected utility
greater than 1 for the first part of the trajectory. After the alert (marked with a vertical
line) such an outcome is no longer possible and the greatest outcome utility possible is 1.
An expected utility of 1 for an after-alert action means that there is no possibility of a
collision occurring. Otherwise the low utility of a collision outcome (Uincident = 0) would
reduce the expected action utility. In this scenario both the nominal and climb actions
have nearly the same utility, near 1, after the alert and for the remainder of the encounter.
The climb maneuver is aggressive enough that, if at any time during the evasion a
nominal action is taken, the climb can be resumed at the next step with only a small loss
of safety. Thus, the nominal action has only slightly less utility and safety than the climb.
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6.6 Action Switching After the Alert
The same policy that determines the alerting threshold is responsible for choosing
alerting system actions after the alert occurs. In the simple descend-mode example in
figure 6.7, the optimal alerting input after the alert is to maintain the climb command
until the end, because doing otherwise would reduce evasion safety.
Whereas previous scenarios were idealized examples of particular modes, figure
6.8 is a scenario where the intruder behaves in a way that is improbable for either mode.
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Figure 6.8: Abnormal Level-Off Scenario
It begins with a constant-speed descent at 2500 ft/min, and levels off about 300 ft lower
than usual, 11,500 horizontal ft from the evader.
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Because the descend-mode probability has converged nearly to 1 by the time the
level-off occurs, and because the intruder's behavior is unlikely in either mode, no
significant further change occurs in the belief state for the remainder of the scenario.
Eventually, the logic sees that the climb maneuver is likely to cause a collision, assuming
it is in the descend mode, and reverts back to the safer nominal action. Thus, the alerting
system is able to maximize safety after an alert by dynamically choosing guidance, a
clear benefit in individual scenarios such as the above. The final switch at 2,000 ft
horizontal separation is the result the computed safety difference between the actions
dropping to zero at that point, with climb being the default action.
Figure 6.9 shows the overall performance benefit of using reversible evasion
maneuvers with this particular system and set of initial conditions, based on the assumed
probabilistic dynamics. Average performance data was generated using Monte Carlo
trajectory simulation, with the system always beginning at the same position and mode
belief state. In one set post-alert command switching was allowed when needed, and in
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Figure 6.9: Average Performance With and Without Reversible Maneuvers
another the same threshold policy was used, but with the evader constrained to a fixed-
climb escape maneuver. In each case trajectories were generated until 10,000 alerts
occurred. The resulting average collision rate, P(SA I Alert), is 0.9993 for both, or
identical within the precision of this simulation. The true unnecessary alert rate is known
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to be the same for both since the same policy determines the threshold. While providing
no apparent safety benefit, the logic with switching caused on average 0.73 switches after
the alert.
6.7 Value of Anticipating Decision Opportunities
The MDP-based alerting method is distinct from other probabilistic alerting
methods in that its decision metrics take into account the possibility of choosing between
different actions at future times, so alerts are more informed and performance should be
better. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the performance differences with
specific alerting scenarios.
An alternate policy was generated where utilities were defined in terms of the
probabilistic (SOC) quantities P(UA) and P(SA), the probabilities of an unnecessary alert
and of a successful alert for an alert generated at that moment. Assuming no alert has yet
occurred, these were defined as the probability of no incident for each alert option, where
the options are either a sustained deferral or a sustained climb respectively. In other
words, the assumption is that each option is a complete action sequence covering all
future time. This assumption is borrowed from recent research probabilistic alerting
systems research (Carpenter & Kuchar; Yang & Kuchar, 1997). P(UA) is undefined after
the alert, but an analogous metric for the post-alert case could be called P(SN) (Safe
Nominal trajectory), defined as the probability of no incident if only nominal actions
follow. The two relevant metrics after the alert would be P(SA) and P(SN). The reward
function was defined similarly to the regular policy: safe non-alert end states give utility
1.1, safe alert outcomes give 1, and collisions give 0.
The resulting alerting threshold is shown in figure 6.10 along with a level-off
mode trajectory. Because the assumption is a that a nominal action will be irreversible if
chosen, that action appears to be a hazardous and low-utility option at the intruder's
initial position, which is on a nominal collision course with the evader for the descend
mode. Even with a descend-mode probability of only 0.25, the overall probability of a
collision lowers the expected utility to nearly 0.8. The climb option is relatively safe, and
106
even though it ensures a maximum outcome utility no greater than 1, it has a higher
expected utility at the outset.
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Figure 6.10: SOC-Metric-Based Alert Policy and Level-Off Scenario
The result is that an alert happens immediately. The mode belief updating process
continues after the alert, and when the intruder levels off at 19,500 ft separation,
P(descend mode) converges to near zero within 2,000 ft with the evasion in progress. At
this point the climb trajectory is seen to be less safe than the nominal trajectory, so the
nominal action is chosen. So, the logic is able to safely guide the aircraft after the alert,
but has committed an unnecessary alert that would have been avoided by the regular logic
in this scenario (figure 6.6).
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In the descend-mode case (figure 6.11) the alert is triggered at the same time. No
switching occurs after the alert, because once mode uncertainty is eliminated the climb
path is clearly the safest option. The policy has successfully avoided a collision. The
regular policy also avoids the collision (figure 6.7), but defers the alert until after the
mode becomes more certain. The SOC-based policy's maneuver avoids the collision by a
larger margin, so in one sense gave the more desirable response, but at the cost of a
higher unnecessary alert probability.
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Figure 6.11: SOC-Metric-Based Alert Policy with Descend-Mode Scenario
Because individual scenarios can favor either policy, it is informative to compare
average performance over many scenarios representative of the intended operating
environment. Figure 6.12 compares the average performance of the two policies, where
trajectories were simulated with each to generate 10,000 alert cases, based on the
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encounter dynamic model defined in section 6.1, and all beginning at the same initial
position and belief state. The metrics used are the average successful alert rate and the
average unnecessary alert rate.
MP policy0.99 - MDP policy Increasing UCR(UCR ')UCR -
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Figure 6.12: Average SOC Performance Comparison for Standard Policy vs.
SOC-Based Threshold
As the example scenarios suggest, for a correct rejection utility of UCR = 1.1, the
SOC-based policy has a safety advantage. The SOC policy avoided any collisions,
compared to 7 collisions in 10,000 alerts for the regular policy. At the same time, the
SOC policy suffers from a relatively high rate of unnecessary alerts. In a simulation of
10,000 level-off trajectories, the regular policy caused no alerts, while the SOC-based
policy caused an alert every time.
Figure 6.13 shows the SOC logic as a region in the SOC space. The alert space is
the shaded area bounded by a diagonal line through the origin. The slope of the line is
equal to the parameter UCR. At each point in time, the policy generates SOC coordinates,
and if these lie outside of the shaded region, the alert is deferred (or the nominal action is
taken, if an alert has already happened). From this representation the location of the
operating point in figure 6.12 is seen to depend on the SOC threshold slope, which at 1.1
is only slightly steeper than the diagonal.
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Figure 6.13: SOC-Space Threshold
If UCR is increased, the slope increases, which should result in deferred alerts and
a reduced unnecessary alert rate, given that scenario trajectories originate near the top,
right corner of the SOC plot. UCR was varied over a range of 1.1 to 3 and the resulting
range of average performance is shown as a curve in figure 6.12. Along with the
expected reduction in the unnecessary alert rate, there is a gradual decrease in average
safety. When the operating point reaches a point directly below the regular policy's SOC
position, the overall unnecessary alert rates are the same, and the SOC policy has a
P(SA I Alert) of 0.98 compared to the regular policy's 0.999, or 20 times the collision
probability, given an alert. From a 10,000 level-off trajectory simulation, the level-off
mode unnecessary alert rate at that point is roughly 4 in 1,000 for the SOC policy,
compared to none for the regular policy. The total alert rate (level-off and descend cases)
is similar for both at 23 per 100. The significance of these differences depends on the
particular alerting application, but there is a clear difference between the two policy
types, with the MDP-based policy allowing a higher overall safety and fewer total and
level-off alerts with the assumed dynamics.
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As discussed in section 2.3, there is a more general philosophy that the alerting
region in SOC space should take whatever shape necessary to optimize performance. For
example, figure 6.14 shows two additional possibilities, each aimed at directly controlling
an aspect of performance. The minimum safety threshold ensures that alerting safety is at
or above a specified limit, T. The maximum unnecessary alert probability threshold
defers alerts until the unnecessary alert probability, a measure of the need for the alert, is
acceptably small.
Minimum Safety Threshold Maximum Unnecessary Alert Probability
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Figure 6.14: Other SOC-Space Thresholds
Figure 6.15 shows corresponding SOC curves for the figure 6.14 logics, generated
by varying the tradeoff parameter T over a range. Again, these logics are unable to reach
the same trade-off of safety for unnecessary alerts that the MLDP-based logic does.
The MDP logic compares favorably with the SOC-based logic because of its more
complete use of information available in the belief state and in recognizing future
decision opportunities. It is also a result of the reward function chosen for this example,
which was constructed with SOC design goals in mind. In general, it should be noted,
these may not be the real goals of every alerting system. For example, in systems with
normal and failure modes (e.g. Parallel landing approaches (Winder & Kuchar, 1999)) an
alert might be considered proper if it occurs during a failure, even if it is an unnecessary
I1
alert. The utility basis of the MDP method is general enough to accommodate such
differences.
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Figure 6.15: Performance of Other SOC-Based Thresholds
6.8 Belief State Modeling Simplification
The MiDP-based alerting method assumes that uncertain state variables like modes
require maintaining and using a belief state. As described in chapter 2, keeping the belief
state current involves a continual filtering process done in real time. The belief state is
then used as an input, along with other state variables, to a pre-computed policy that
identifies the best action to take. Like other continuous state variables it is often
necessary to simplify its domain for describing the policy, such as in the example in this
chapter where a continuous range of mode distributions was replaced with a small,
discrete set. The smaller the domain, the easier it is to compute a policy using the belief
state as a variable. However, oversimplifying the belief state domain could unacceptably
impact performance. This section will discuss the relationship of the degree of belief
state simplification to the performance of the alerting system.
The simplest way to reduce the complexity of belief state variables is to assume
the system is in one or the other mode, and do no belief updating. For example, one
option is to assume level-off dynamics always hold. In figure 6.16, this limits the alert
space to some region within the belief state rage between P(descend) = 0 and 0.25.
While never alerting during level-off scenarios, during descend mode scenarios this logic
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Figure 6.16: Belief State Simplification - Assume No Descend Mode
can allow collisions without providing any alert (missed detections), or issue alerts too
late (late alerts).
The other extreme case is to assume that the descend mode always holds
(figure 6.17). Now the reverse problem happens: safety during descend-mode scenario
is ensured, while unnecessary alerts happen during many level-off cases, since the
threshold contour extends beyond the nominal level-off separation.
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Figure 6.17: Belief State Simplification - Assume No Level-off Mode
Eliminating one mode or the other as discussed has a significant negative effect
on the performance of the logic, either increasing unnecessary alerts or reducing safety.
A third possible belief state simplification is a 2-value domain including both of the
extreme belief cases already considered separately. Recall that the discrete belief state
model used in the original policy was a 5-value progression of belief states separated by
probability increments of 0.25. Utility function matrices were created over this set, one
for each action. Then, to generate action utilities for a given belief state, linear
interpolation was done between discrete elements of the utility matrices. The suggestion
is to reduce the discrete domain to the smallest set that accounts for both of the extreme
belief states, and then assume there is a linear relationship between the belief state and
the action utility.
A policy was found for this belief state model and examined in a similar way to
previous examples. Because at each extreme beief ste is no possibility of a belief
updating cycle changing the belief state, the simplified policy can be found by removing
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the middle three belief cases from the existing policy. This is because once the belief
state reaches one extreme or other, no future evidence gathered can change the belief
state, making the policy at each extreme belief state independent of that at any other
belief state.
Figure 6.18 compares the utility traces resulting from each policy version and the
idealized descend-mode scenario. Visually they are nearly the same. They both result in
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Figure 6.18: Utility Trace Comparison: 2 vs. 5-Belief-State Simplification
deferring the alert until the mode uncertainty is nearly eliminated, and they both result in
an alert at the same moment. The policies also react similarly to a level-off scenario,
each avoiding an unnecessary alert.
Compared using the Monte.Carlo scenario simulation described in section 6.6
with 10,000 alert scenarios, they both had P(SA I Alert) values of 0.9993, and the
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sampling error of their difference is 0.001 or less with 95% certainty. The unnecessary
alert fractions are 0.314 for the regular logic and 0.322 for the 2-belief state version,
different by 0.008. The standard deviation of the sample difference is 0.007, so there is
not a clear difference in the unnecessary alert probability between the two logics. Based
on 30,000 trajectory level-off simulations, the logics had level-off-mode unnecessary
alert rates of 25 (the original) and 19 (2-belief state) per 100,000 level-offs. For the given
sample size (30,000), there is no clear difference in level-off alert performance between
the two logics.
A possible explanation for the similarity is, besides any coincidental linearity in
the actual utility functions, that the structure of the system and utility definitions cause
alerts to be put off in every case until mode uncertainty is nearly gone. This means that
at the alerting threshold, the belief state is always P(descend-mode) ~ 1, which is a belief
state where action utilities were computed precisely for both policies. The utilities at the
threshold are then expected to be similar, even with an approximation of the utility
function. To avoid unnecessary alerts in the interval up to this point, it is only necessary
that both policies have nominal action utility greater than the climb action utility, so some
error due to utility function approximation is tolerable.
6.9 Chapter Summary
In this chapter the use of uncertain modes in an alerting system was investigated,
using the example of a 2-aircraft encounter where, depending on an uncertain mode
variable, the aircraft may or may not be in danger of colliding. A Markov state was
defined for the 2-aircraft system, including a belief state for the mode. This state, a
corresponding dynamic model and a reward function describing alerting priorities were
used to generate the alerting logic, or "policy." Operation of the policy, both as an
alerting threshold and as a post-alert guidance logic, was shown with example scenarios.
The value of taking future decisions into account, as the policy inherently does,
was shown using example scenarios and with global performance averages generated by
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Monte Carlo trajectory simulation. This involved defining alternative policies where
fixed maneuvers were the assumed choices.
The importance of the mode belief state and belief updating process to effective
alerting was shown. This was accomplished by looking at the effect of disabling the
mode-update process in example scenarios, and comparing global performance metrics
from Monte Carlo simulation. In addition it was shown that for acceptable alerting
performance a policy may require only limited information about the belief state,
depending on the situation. A simplified belief state domain was compared to a more
complete belief state model in discussing this.
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7. Summary and Contributions
7.1 Summary
In this thesis a framework for designing hazard avoidance alerting systems was
presented, based on a Markov decision process model of alerting, and motivated by
identified weaknesses with existing methods. Two alerting "logics" were created using
the framework and were compared in terms of standard performance measures to logics
created with more typical methods, demonstrating a benefit.
The use of MDP methods was motivated by a lack of certain features in existing
methods for direct derivation of alerting logics from performance requirements. One of
these is the ability to reason about future decision opportunities that might influence the
current decision. In particular, such knowledge is important for placement of the alerting
threshold, because it is what allows deferral of alerts: knowing whether safe options will
be available in the future affects the current decision. Another desired feature is the
ability to model and account for uncertain dynamic modes in the observed situation.
Modes describe distinct types of behavior a system could exhibit at a given time, and
uncertainty in the mode complicates the state predictions needed for decision making.
Mode uncertainty also motivates being aware of future decision opportunities, because
actions have predictable effects on mode uncertainty. In particular, alerts may be
deferred partly in expectation of decreasing mode uncertainty.
The MDP-based methodology requires a Markov state and probabilistic dynamic
model of the operator-plant system, a probabilistic observation model, and creation of a
reward function that describes the alerting system's (designer's) goals in terms of
cumulative rewards that can be gained along future system trajectories. Uncertain mode
variables are modeled probabilistically, and the resulting distribution, or belief state, can
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be updated at each step to reflect changes in the uncertainty due to new evidence. With
these components, MDP theory provides means to derive an efficient alerting policy that
allows computations for alerting decisions to be done in real time. The policy determines
both the threshold for alerts and the later sequence of cues that guide an operator during
resolution of the hazard.
The policy is a function of the current system state that produces the best action
from an available set. The state can be a set of variables or a distribution over
variables-a belief state-including mode variables. In the belief state case the solution
can be less straightforward, but methods exist.
The policy inherently takes into account future decisions through application of
Bellman's equation, which itself is an effect of the principle of optimality. Under an
assumption of utility-based preferences, this principle says that the utility of an action at a
given state depends only on the utility of reaching the next state, assuming the next-state
utility is optimal (maximized). Thus, choosing the next action requires no assumption of
any particular trajectory being followed later.
The MIDP-based methodology was used to derive alerting logics for two kinds of
aircraft encounter, one a head-on collision scenario with random altitude variations, and
the other an uncertain 2-mode scenario with a safe (level-off) and an unsafe (continued
descent) mode. These case studies demonstrated how alerting system goals can be
expressed as a reward function, computation of an alerting policy, and use of the policy
as an alerting and guidance threshold. The second case study also showed the modeling
of an uncertain mode, effects of the mode on policy computation, and the behavior of the
resulting logic. In the second case study the MDP-based alerting logic was tested against
alternate logics designed according to current practice using standard performance
metrics, and the performance benefits of MDP design were made apparent. The
importance of using global average performance metrics, including traditional metrics
like unnecessary alert and incident rates, alongside reward function requirements was
also explained.
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A claim is made that the reward function basis of the alerting process must agree
with or complement the alerting preferences of the human operators. This is to minimize
the rate of improper alerts, defined as alerts that the operators find incorrect, and which
include nuisance alerts. However, at this time there is no clear description of this
relationship to guide design of the reward function. In the case studies a simple reward
function was chosen that makes a trade-off between safety and unnecessary alerts at the
threshold. Trading off safety for unnecessary alerts is an established practice in alerting
design. The resulting performance compares well with SOC-based alerting, where a
threshold is defined in the space of P(SA) and P(UA). In terms of the global SOC
performance metrics, the MiDP-based logic achieves superior safety to compared SOC-
based logics for a given unnecessary alert rate. In addition the MDP-based logic is better
able to avoid alerts during level-off mode scenarios while maintaining a given level a
safety.
The case study systems were made purposely simple for clarity. This leaves a
question of whether MDP methods will also apply to more complex alerting systems
requiring more state variables. In principle they do, but because the number of states can
increase exponentially with the number of state variables, it is easily possible to run into
computing speed and memory limits (Bellman called this problem the "curse of
dimensionality.") As a consequence, more complex alerting systems may require policy
or utility function approximations that reduce the number of variables and states. The
tabular utility function representation and policy derivation methods that were convenient
in the case studies may be too inefficient for use general.
7.2 Contributions
A new methodology was described for designing hazard avoidance alerting
systems, based on Markov decision process theory. It has a number of advantages:
1. It provides a means of generating an efficient alerting logic directly from
requirements, reducing the need for design iterations to meet goals.
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a. It was demonstrated with aviation alerting case studies having the core
elements of more complex alerting problems.
b. The use of a utility model of performance requirements was described and
demonstrated.
2. It makes complete use of available information, including
a. Information about mode uncertainty.
b. Information about future states and decision opportunities; in particular,
whether deferring an alert leaves sufficient flexibility for future action, and
whether future observations will reduce mode uncertainty.
3. It unifies the design of the alerting threshold and guidance, including when flexible
escape guidance is needed. This allows knowledge about future guidance to directly
affect the threshold. Earlier efforts have focused on optimal definition of the alerting
threshold or have assumed fixed escape maneuvers.
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Definitions
Action
Action logic
A decision option available to the alerting system
Component of the alerting system that chooses the
alerting action based on the current belief state and
previous action
Action space Set of possible alerting system actions
AILS
Alerting system
Belief compression
Belief space
Belief state
Bellman equation
CD
NASA Airborne Information for Lateral Spacing
collision avoidance logic for parallel approach
collision avoidance
Automation that monitors a human-operated system
and issues alerts and guidance to avoid unexpected
hazards
Refers to methods of approximating a range of
belief states with a simpler function having fewer
parameters
The set of all possible belief states
A probability distribution over the situation space
that describes alerting system uncertainty about the
state
Fundamental equation of MDP theory that describes
the relationship of the maximum expected utility at
each state to that of neighboring states, reachable by
a single action
Correct detection
Correct detection
Correct rejection
CR
A state trajectory in which an alert occurs,
preventing an incident that would have happened
otherwise
A state trajectory in which no alert occurs and no
incident occurs
Correct rejection
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Deferral action
Escape maneuver
Evader
Evidence
Expected utility function
Filtering
Finite horizon
Fully observable
GPWS
Hazard space
Also nominal action. The alerting system action
prior to any alert occurring, when it is passively
monitoring
A maneuver due to repeatedly using a given
maneuver policy after an alert has occurred
Aircraft that is assumed to receive and respond to
alerts to avoid the intruder
Information gathered by the alerting system in the
form of observations of the situation and recalled
past actions
Function mapping each state into an expected utility
The process of updating the a belief state, given a
stream of observations
A class of Markov decision processes in which
there is assumed to be a finite time remaining
before the process ends
The exact situation state is available through a
single observation
Ground Proximity Warning System. Alerting
system for preventing "controlled flight into terrain"
accidents
The set of all situation states where it is possible for
an incident to occur
Improper alert
Induced incident
An alerting system action that an operator believes
is incorrect
An undesirable event that an alerting system is
designed to prevent from happening
An incident that occurs after an alert happens, that
would not have occurred without the alert
A class of Markov decision processes in which
there is assumed to be no end point
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IA
II
Improper alert
Incident
Induced incident
Infinite horizon
Aircraft that may endanger the evader and is
assumed not controllable by the alerting system
The total information available to the alerting
system about the situation through observations and
prior knowledge. The belief state
Late alert
Late alert
Maneuver
Maneuver policy
Markov property
Maximum expected utility function
Maximum expected utility principle
MD
MDP
Missed detection
Mode
NA
An alert that is necessary but happens too late to
prevent an incident
Sequential use of a single maneuver policy over
some interval
A function that maps a state or belief state into a
specific alerting system action
The property of a state whereby knowing the state
allows a correct state prediction (exact or
probabilistic prediction)
Function mapping each state into the largest
expected utility possible for a set of possible actions
Decision criterion stating that the preferred decision
is the one that gives the maximum expected
outcome utility
Missed detection
Markov decision process
A case where an incident happens without any prior
alert
A discrete state variable that represents distinct
dynamic behaviors a system can exhibit
Nuisance alert
Nominal action
Nominal maneuver
Nuisance alert
A deferral action by the alerting system
Assuming no alert has occurred, the maneuver due
to repeating the deferral action indefinitely
An improper alert where an operator considers the
alert unjustified
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Intruder
Knowledge
LA
Observation
Observation space
Operator
Partially observable
Plant
Policy
Policy iteration
POMDP
Precision Runway Monitor
Principle of optimality
Prior belief state
PRM
Rewardfunction
A situation state measurement at a given time
The set of possible observations for a particular
state space and sensor function
A human operating within a larger situation, who
can receive alerts from an alerting system
Refers to a situation where an observation does not
provide the exact and entire state
A system controlled by operators within a situation
A function that maps any state (or belief state) into
a particular action
A method of finding a policy for an MDP that
involves alternately computing the utility function
implied by a candidate policy, and calculating a
new candidate policy from the utility function
Partially observable Markov decision process
Alerting system for preventing collisions during
closely spaced parallel approaches
In a sequential decision process, maximizing the
utility of the system trajectory (past and future)
implies maximizing the utility of the future
trajectory.
A belief state that is assumed given at the start of a
Markov decision process
Precision runway monitor
A function defined over state space that specifies
the reward gained by the alerting system when the
state is occupied
Successful alert
Safe nominal trajectory
Sensorfunction A function that maps the situation state into an
observation
A system composed of human operators and a plant
that they control
Situation
130
SA
SN
Situation space
Situation state
SOC
State
The set of possible situation states
The Markov state describing a situation
System operating characteristic
A state vector
State vector
Stationary
Successful alert
System Operating Characteristic
TCAS
Trajectory utility function
Transition function
UA
Unnecessary alert
Unsuccessful alert
Utility
Utility function
Value iteration
A set of variables that together describe the
condition of a system at a given time
Refers to a function that remains unchanged with
passing time
An alert that is not followed by an incident
A pair of performance metrics, either the probability
of a safe alert and the probability of an unnecessary
alert, given that an alert happens, or the frequency
of a safe alert and of an unnecessary alert given that
an alert happens.
Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System. An
alerting system for preventing mid-air collisions
between aircraft
A function mapping a state trajectory into a utility
value
The function describing the future state or state
distribution for a given initial state and control
(action) input
Unnecessary alert
An alert that is not followed by an incident, but
where no incident would have occurred without the
alert
An alert followed by an incident
A scalar value describing the degree of desirability
or goodness of something
See trajectory utility function. Also, short for a
maximum expected utility function
A method of solving Markov decision problems,
where the correct maximum expected utility
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function is arrived at through iterative application of
the Bellman equation to a candidate utility function
over the entire state domain, each time using the
most recent utility function
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Appendix A: Overview of Belief State Filtering
Consider a discrete-time alerting process described by the following components:
1. A situation state, s
2. An alert signal, a
3. An observation signal 0 determined by a sensor function, O( 0(k) s(k))
4. A state transition function, T( s(k+1) I s(k), a(k) )
5. Prior knowledge about S in the form of a probability distribution, bsco)( s(O))
The functions O(-) and T(-) are in the form of probability distributions over the
spaces of o and s, respectively.
At each point in time, an observation ( 0(k) ) is made and an action ( a(k) ) is
taken by the alerting system. After k time steps, beginning with k = 0, the entire history
of these values is:
{ o(0), a(0), o(1), a(1), . o(k-1), a(k-1), o(k) }
or more compactly,
{ e(0), e(1), ... , e(k-1), o(k) }
where e(i) is the "evidence" from time step i:
e(i) = { o(i), a(i) }.
This history is the complete set of observable evidence concerning the situation.
By definition, the belief state at k is the probability distribution of s(k), conditioned on
all of this evidence:
br(k)( s(k) ) = p( s(k)I e(0), e(1), ... , e(k-1), o(k))
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Applying the definition of conditional probability, this becomes:
= cc p( o(k) I s(k), e(O), e(1), ... , e(k-1) ) p( s(k) I e(O), e(1), ... , e(k-1) )
where cc is a normalization constant that makes the distribution sum to 1. The rightmost
factor is the conditional probability distribution of the current state on all past observable
evidence. The middle factor is the conditional distribution of the current observation on
the current state and all previous observations and actions. Since the observation depends
on the current state and nothing else (by definition of the sensor function), the expression
simplifies to:
= a p( o(k) I s(k) ) p( s(k) e(O), e(kl), ... , e(k-1) )
To evaluate the last factor, it can be expanded to show the implicit conditioning of s(k)
on the previous state, s(k-1):
p( s(k)Ie(O), e(1),... ,e(k-1)) =
E p( s(k) I s(k-1), e(O), e(1), ... , e(k-1) ) p( s(k-1)| e(O), e(1), ... , e(k-1) )
The summation is of s(k-1) over the space S. Due to the Markov property assumed for s,
this simplifies to:
= Z p( s(k) s(k-1), a(k-1) ) p( s(k-1) I e(O), e(1), ... , e(k-1) )
So the belief state is:
bs(k)( s(k)) =
cc p( o(k) I s(k) ) X p( s(k) I s(k-1), a(k-1) ) p( s(k-1) I e(O), e(1), ... , e(k-1) )
Note that p( o(k) I s(k) ) is just the sensor function, and p( s(k) I s(k-1), a(k-1) ) is the
transition function. The distribution p( s(k-1) I e(O), e(1), ... , e(k-1) ) is the belief state
for the previous time step, bs(k-1)( s(k-1) ), assuming that it reduces to p( s(k-1)I e(0),
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e(1), ... , o(k-1) ) due to causality (the action a(k-1) is chosen after the belief state for
s(k-1) is determined, so it should not influence that belief state).
To summarize in more explicit notation, the belief state is:
bs(k)( s(k) ) = a O( o(k) I s(k) ) I T( s(k) I s(k-1), a(k-1) ) bs(k.1)( s(k-1) )
Thus, for the assumed observation and transition functions, there is a recursive
calculation for the belief state. Once the belief state is calculated for one time step, that
belief state along with the next action and observation will allow a calculation of the
same effort for the next belief state. At initiation of the process, when there is no
previously computed belief state, a prior belief state, bs(o)( s(O) ), must be assumed.
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Appendix B:
Common Philosophies of Alerting Logic Design
Three common philosophies of alerting logic design have been identified to
classify existing or proposed hazard alerting systems. Following is a more detailed and
general description of each philosophy. Parallel approach collision prevention serves as
an example.
B. 1 Trajectory Conformance Monitoring
This type of logic uses non-conformance of a system to established procedures as
a basis for alerting. For example, figure B.1 shows a system state with respect to a
normal operating region in state space. If the state exits outside the normal operating
region an alert is issued. The system exists to prevent occurrences of a hazard, but no
explicit prediction of a hazard event is required for triggering an alert. As shown, the
normal region is defined so as to be mutually exclusive of the hazard, even though the
hazard is not explicitly modeled in the final algorithm. In PRM, for example, as long as
both aircraft remain outside the NTZ, the hazard cannot occur. An aircraft entering the
NTZ will trigger an alert whether or not it actually threatens another aircraft.
System state Hazard (unmodeled)
Normal states defined by procedure
Figure B.1: Trajectory Conformance Alerting
A deviation ("blunder") from the normal procedure is a necessary precursor to a hazard
event, so it can be argued that an observed deviation from normal is sufficient reason for
an alert and corrective action, provided such a policy does not result in a high rate of
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alerts occurring without a blunder. Frequent unnecessary alerts during normal system
operation would come to be perceived as incorrect by operators, and might in time cause
operators to ignore or delay responding to alerts.
In addition to establishing that the non-blunder alert rate is acceptably low, it
should be shown that when a blunder does occur there will be an evasive maneuver
having an adequate likelihood of success. Such an analysis typically involves a reference
dynamic model of the system, and iterative adjustment of the threshold. Because of the
dependence of the threshold on the operational procedure, it may be necessary to adjust
the procedure itself to achieve performance goals. For example, it was concluded that
PRM could be used with parallel runways spaced no less than 3400 feet apart because
below this spacing the likelihood of safe resolution of a blunder was too low in
simulation studies.
B.2 Nominal Trajectory Hazard Prediction (Unnecessary Alert
Prevention)
This alerting strategy involves continuous checking for a particular hazard
through explicit prediction of the non-alert, or nominal, system trajectory (figure B.2).
For an alert to occur, the hazard event must be predicted. Under this philosophy, the
logic avoids alerts that are not clearly justified with respect to the hazard. The hazard is
Predicted nominal (non-alert) trajectory
System state a
Maximum prediction time
Figure B.2: Nominal Trajectory Prediction Alerting
described in terms of a set of state variables composing a state space. The trajectory
model, which might be probabilistic, worst case, or a single predicted trajectory, is
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propagated forward in this state space from the current, measured location. In the figure
B.2 example, the trajectory model is a worst case model, and is predicting that a hazard
may be encountered in the future.
Due to uncertainty in prediction and the consequent possibility of unnecessary
alerts, it is insufficient to define the alerting rule as "alert when a hazard is predicted."
Typically an additional metric or metrics are required for threshold definition. Possible
metrics include the degree of certainty in occurrence of a predicted event (for a
probabilistic trajectory model), or the predicted time-to-collision (for worst case or
single-trajectory models). The values of threshold parameters must be chosen to satisfy
both safety and unnecessary alert goals. In the illustrated example, collision prediction
time is the metric and a particular value of this must be selected to define the threshold.
Using a reference model of the behavior of the entire human-controlled system (able to
describe its dynamics both before and after an alert occurs, and covering all possible
initial conditions in state space), optimal threshold parameters are determined, typically
through repeated-Monte Carlo simulation and adjustment (Yang & Kuchar, 2000).
Whether a hazard is imminent for the nominal trajectory is not a direct indication
of whether an evasion maneuver will be safe. In this type of logic, the justification of
alerts is inherently stressed over the safety of the alerting decision.
In the course of analysis, the complexity of the logic may increase to cover
special cases that were not initially foreseen. This is likely when few state variables are
available for measurement or the actual system dynamics are not well understood. An
example is the development of TCAS logic for midair collision prevention. This logic
began with a simple range rate and time-to-collision prediction model (with adjustable
parameters for the threshold prediction time and miss distance) characterized by large
trajectory errors, and was eventually augmented with conditional statements and new
parameters in order to handle problem scenarios (Drumm, 1996). For example, a
situation where two aircraft unknowingly fly parallel at the same speed may be
unacceptable, yet trigger no alerts when using a time-to-collision criterion only. To cover
such problem scenarios additional checks were added to the logic.
139
Other examples of logics that use explicit incident prediction as the basis of
thresholds are GPWS and AILS.
B.3 Existence of Safe Escape Options (Safety Monitoring)
In general there may. be specific completion conditions that must be met in order
for a potential incident to be considered resolved, and it is possible to make deferral of
alerts conditional on the predicted attainment of such conditions. For example, the MIT
logic issues alerts based on knowledge that a collision will probably not occur within a
certain period of time following the alert.
This type of logic is superficially similar to the nominal trajectory hazard
checking method described in section B.2 in that it involves a trajectory model. As
illustrated in figure B.3, a hazard event is once again defined in terms of measurable state
variables. A trajectory model is used to propagate the system state, but this time under
State variable criteria for
a completed escape
System state
Predicted post-alert trajectories for different maneuvers
Figure B.3: Ensuring that Safe Options Exist
the assumption that an alert has occurred or will occur at a particular time, resulting in
escape maneuvers. In general there may be multiple maneuver options (represented by
evolving state envelopes-each resembling. a horn-in figure B.3), corresponding to
different warning inputs that can be issued to operators. Completion conditions are
defined in terms of the evasion trajectory and state variables. As shown, completion
conditions may require that the system reach a specific region in state space. In addition,
it may be required that the system reach the completion state set within a particular time
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interval. Finally, if the hazard is some catastrophe, then the completion state set cannot
intersect with the set of hazard states and be considered as part of a desirable alerting
outcome.
If a probabilistic trajectory model is to be used, then alerting decisions will be
based on the probability of reaching the completion state set within the required time
interval. Therefore an additional component of completion is a threshold probability,
such that above this an alerting decision is considered safe.
If the trajectory model is worst case or a single trajectory, safety requires that all
trajectories for an alerting option reach the completion set within a given time interval.
Safety is marginal if any one of the trajectories reaches a boundary value of the
completion state set or allowed time interval.
According to this philosophy an alert may be deferred as long as an available
alerting option is safe. An alert can no longer be deferred when safety becomes marginal.
In other words, an alert is considered justified when there may be no safe option
remaining at the next alerting opportunity.
In this method safety is fixed at the threshold, resulting in a loss of direct control
over unnecessary alerts. This is because whether a post-alert maneuver is safe is not a
direct indication of whether the nominal system trajectory is safe (i.e. whether an alert
will be an unnecessary alert). For example, it may be possible for an evasion option to
become marginally unsafe, triggering an alert, even when no hazard would be
encountered on the nominal trajectory.
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